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Introduction
In the summer of 1929 a man put his finger to a button. The man was Charles 
Augustus Lindbergh, the patron saint of American aviation, and the button was at one 
end of a Western Union telegraph circuit that connected Los Angeles to New York City. 
At 3:05 PM, Pacific Standard Time, Lindbergh pressed the button, then pressed it again. 
Three thousand miles away, in the train shed of New York City's Pennsylvania Station, a 
light flashed, twice. At that signal and to the cheers of thousands, a train named The 
Airway Limited chuffed away from the platform and began its overnight journey to 
Columbus, Ohio.  In the train's observation car were seventeen passengers, men and 1
women, transcontinental travelers of a new age. The train was the first link in a hybrid 
air-rail system that would carry them across the country. Forty-eight hours later, these 
passengers would arrive in Los Angeles. Their journey between the two coasts would 
be faster than any before it.
With the push of a button, Lindbergh formally opened Transcontinental Air 
Transport, America's first transcontinental passenger airline. The airline would halve the 
time necessary to cross the continent and open a new age in passenger aviation. And, 
in its short history, the airline also embodied ideas about the possibilities of flight, the 
limitations of technology, the necessity of compromises, the power of celebrity, and the 
promise of national integration. Activated by Lindbergh's button, these ideas exploded 
outward at his push, leaving marks on the physical and cultural landscapes of America
—marks that are still present today.
 "Lindbergh and His Bride Here" The Los Angeles Times, 8 Jul. 1929: 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers 1
Los Angeles Times (1881-1986), 2 Nov. 2009.
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Two years earlier, in 1927, Lindbergh had climbed into a single-engine plane and 
taken off from a Long Island airfield on an attempt to fly across the Atlantic Ocean. After 
thirty-three hours, he landed in Paris, and his success thrilled Americans to the 
possibilities of aviation. Equally thrilled was Clement Keys, an aviation octopus in 
control of twenty-six different companies. After a brief courtship, the two joined forces in 
May of 1928 to create Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. This venture represented a 
new way of thinking about aviation. Unlike airmail carriers, T.A.T. was to be an airline for 
passengers: It would carry them in luxury and comfort and its revenue would come 
solely from their fares, not from the lucrative government contracts that supported 
airmail. On July 7, 1929, after more than a year of planning and promotion, the airline 
opened at the push of a button, to national acclaim. The Los Angeles Times hailed the 
airline with the headline "Chapter Added to Aviation History."  2
But a year later, T.A.T. was gone. Without the subsidy of airmail contracts, the 
airline lost money on every flight. Further battered by the stock market crash of October 
1929, the company's directors acceded to Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown's 
request that T.A.T. merge with Western Air Express, an airmail carrier. On July 15, 1930, 
a year and eight days after Lindbergh pushed his button, the two companies gave birth 
to Transcontinental and Western Air. Their progeny thrived. T.&W.A. became T.W.A., 
Trans-World Airlines, one of the largest airlines in America and the country's de facto 
national carrier at the close of the twentieth century. T.A.T. was left a holding company, 
an empty shell. It dissolved in 1934. 
This essay is about that forgotten airline.
 "Chapter Added to Aviation History," The Los Angeles Times, 8 Jul. 1929: A1. ProQuest Historical 2
Newspapers Los Angeles Times (1881-1986), 2 Nov. 2009.
Fraga  3
–––––––––––––––––––
I make several related arguments in this paper. First, I argue that Clement Keys 
and Transcontinental Air Transport brought passenger service to the skies. The airline 
set the paradigm for passenger aviation, reassuring Americans that they could expect 
comfort and safety from this new—and, to many Americans, still scary—form of travel. 
T.A.T. partnered with the Pennsylvania Railroad and built on earlier models of 
passenger service—such as George Pullman's railway coaches and Fred Harvey's 
eating houses—to meet passengers' expectations for service. The airline marketed itself 
to business travelers and tourists alike, showing how different types of travelers could 
benefit from the speed of the airplane. T.A.T. domesticated aviation, taking it out of the 
realm of the daredevil pilots and into the realm of business. 
Second, I argue that the importance of early domestic passenger aviation—and, 
in particular, the importance of Transcontinental Air Transport—has not been fully 
appreciated. T.A.T. flew for only a year and was overshadowed in death by its larger and 
more successful offspring, T.&W.A.  But the history of T.A.T. offers critical insight into the 3
development of American passenger aviation. T.A.T. flew passengers, and only 
passengers, at a time when almost all airlines shunned them.  It survived without 4
government subsidy in a crowded boom marketplace characterized by high rates of 
 In Lindbergh's many biographies, for instance, T.A.T. is mentioned only as a passing note of interest 3
between his famous transatlantic flight in 1927 and the infamous kidnapping of his infant son in 1932. A. 
Scott Berg's "Lindbergh," widely regarded as Lindbergh's definitive biography, is better than most, 
although Berg devotes only four pages to Lindbergh's involvement with T.A.T. Other popular biographies 
mention T.A.T. only once. See: Walter L. Hixson, Charles A. Lindbergh: Lone Eagle. (New York: 
HarperCollins College Publishers, 1996.) 57. See also: James Cross Giblin, Charles A. Lindbergh: A 
Human Hero. (New York: Clarion Books, 1997.) 100-101.
 R. E. G. Davies, Airlines of the United States Since 1914. (London: Putnam, 1972.) 80.4
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corporate mortality.  Its organization predated government attempts to establish 5
passenger aviation by three years, and, because T.A.T. operated independent of 
government subsidy, the actions of its directors followed the logic of the marketplace, 
not that of government incentives.
Historians usually invoke federal airmail contracts to explain the development of 
American aviation, and conventional histories date the rise of passenger aviation to the 
1930 McNary-Watres Act. After the 1925 Kelly Act authorized the U.S. Post Office to 
contract with private companies to transport airmail, the McNary-Watres Act turned 
those contracts into policy instruments. It changed airmail payments so that they were 
based on the amount of space an airplane left available for airmail, not the number of 
pieces of airmail it carried. This new rate structure incentivized the operation of larger 
airplanes, which, having more than one engine, tended also to be safer and more 
reliable. Walter Folger Brown, the Postmaster General, granted additional bonuses to 
airlines that carried passengers and that equipped their airplanes with radios and 
navigation aids. Through financial incentives, the government hoped to encourage 
passenger transport on larger, safer airplanes.  The Watres Act, while hugely important 6
to the development of American aviation, tells only the story of passenger aviation as it 
sprang from airmail. This focus has marginalized early passenger airlines like T.A.T.—
airlines that should be at the forefront of our interrogation of early passenger aviation. 
By understanding how aviation started, we can better understand how it operates today.
 Most early airlines "either gained mail contracts or went broke; out of 77 formed between 1925 and 5
1932, only 17... were still operating in January, 1931." See Ronald Miller and David Sawers, The 
Technical Development of Modern Aviation. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968.) 17.
 F. Robert van der Linden, Airlines and Air Mail: The Post Office and the Birth of the Commercial Aviation 6
Industry. (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 2002.) See especially 1-61.
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Still, T.A.T.'s name hid logistical legerdemain. Although air travel offered 
significant time savings over rail travel, aviation technology was not yet sufficiently 
mature to permit night flying. T.A.T. solved this by flying its passengers during the day 
and placing them on sleeper trains overnight, so that they could travel even while they 
slept. The Pennsylvania Railroad, one of the airline's partners, promoted the airline as 
offering "Two Days By Plane, Two Nights By Train."  Rail was still king in the late 1920s, 7
but that was changing. The number of passenger miles flown by U.S. airlines more than 
doubled between 1929 and 1930. Over the next thirty years, the number of passenger 
miles traveled by air continued to climb, surpassing the number traveled by rail in 1958.  8
While T.A.T. did not free itself or its passengers from the rule of the rails, the airline 
stands as the first marker of this transition from rail travel to air, a hybrid creation that 
existed halfway between each mode of transport. T.A.T. recapitulated this rail-air 
transition even as it reproduced it.
This essay also engages with broader questions in the field of aviation history. 
The field has developed significantly since 1989, when James Hansen called for 
historians to move away from detail-oriented histories of technology and instead write 
"broadly synthetic, contextual, and interdisciplinary studies [that] explore the meaning of 
a particular field of history in terms of what it means to others."  This essay builds on the 9
work of numerous authors who answered Hansen's call, including Joseph Corn, F. 
Robert van der Linden, David Courtwright, and Daniel Rust, all of whom have argued 
that the technology of aviation can only be fully understood in a social context. This 
 Pennsylvania Railroad, Two Days by Plane, Two Nights by Train, [1929]. MOF Hatfield, LEV-368.7
 Davies, Airlines, 667, 671.8
 James R. Hansen, "Aviation History in the Wider View," Technology and Culture 30 (July 1989). 643.9
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shift, while important, is unfinished, and I hope that this essay furthers the 
understanding of aviation as a technology intertwined with society and culture.
Third, I argue that the technology of aviation furthered Americans' understanding 
of their country as a bounded national unit. Here, I build on the work of Benedict 
Anderson and Alan Trachtenberg. Anderson argues that print capitalism made it 
possible for people to understand themselves as members of large, interconnected 
communities—that it allowed them to 'think the nation.'  Trachtenberg argues that the 10
rise of the corporation in late 19th century America spurred social and cultural changes, 
resulting in a society that was more national than local, more together than apart.  11
Aviation advertisements traded in motifs of interconnection and incorporation, 
presenting the idea of a national United States shrunk by the speed of the airplane. The 
story of T.A.T. is partly a story about the power of technology to change how we see and 
order our world. This point builds on the work of Wolfgang Schivelbusch and Joseph 
Corn. Schivelbusch argues that the locomotive's ability to move faster than the speed of 
nature cleaved apart notions of time and distance, simultaneously shrinking and 
expanding the natural world.  The airplane, which flew faster than a train could travel, 12
reproduced this change. Corn argues that Americans saw aviation as more than a 
mechanical technology: They saw it as the harbinger of a bright future. The 
transcendent nature of mechanical flight seemed to promise a new age of prosperity 
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. (New 10
York: Verso, 1999.) 22, 44-45.
 Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age. (New York: Hill 11
and Wang, 1982.) 3-10.
 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th 12
Century. (Berkeley, CA: University of California P, 1987.) 33-44.
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and peace, of unity and happiness.  T.A.T. built partly on these feelings of air-13
mindedness.
Finally, I argue that aviation had particular power in the developing American 
West. Just over thirty years before Lindbergh flew across the Atlantic, Frederick Jackson 
Turner cast his gaze towards the Pacific and heralded the close of the American frontier. 
With the first word in its name, Transcontinental Air Transport broke with the regionally-
focussed airmail carriers that preceded it and instead took up the mantle of manifest 
destiny that John O'Sullivan had knit nearly a century earlier.  T.A.T. travelers bore west 14
from New York until they reached the golden terminus of Los Angeles, California, and 
the bulk of the Transcontinental Air Transport route lay over the vast stretches of fields 
and deserts west of the Mississippi River.
Transportation has been widely acknowledged as an essential component of 
analysis for historians of the American West, but it is railroads and automobiles, not 
airlines, that are largely credited with tying the West into eastern centers of capital and 
culture and aiding the region's national integration.  For western cities and towns, 15
aviation offered a future: An airport was, at once, a transportation link to other places, 
an economic alternative to the rule of the rails, and proof that a town was up-to-date. 
 Joseph J. Corn, The Winged Gospel: America's Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950. (New York: Oxford 13
UP, 1983.) 4-12.
 John L. O'Sullivan, "Annexation," The United States Magazine and Democratic Review 17 (July 1845): 14
5–10. O'Sullivan defended annexing Texas by declaring that it was America's "manifest destiny to 
overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying 
millions." 'Manifest destiny' became the belief that America was fated to expand across the continent to 
the Pacific Ocean.
 On railroads, see Carlos A. Schwantes and James P. Ronda, The West the Railroads Made. (Seattle: 15
University of Washington P, 2008.) On railroads and automobiles, see Marguerite S. Shaffer, See America 
First: Tourism and National Identity, 1880-1940. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution P, 2001.) See 
also: Carlos A. Schwantes, Going Places: Transportation Redefines the Twentieth-Century West. 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2003.) Schwantes briefly mentions the role of air transportation in the American 
West.
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Regional aviation joined ranches to small Western cities and towns, such towns to each 
other, and also to the rest of the nation. Then, during World War II, the aerospace 
industry and the migrants it pulled west reshaped the economy and culture of the West 
Coast. Over the past half-century, numerous regional airlines have been founded with 
an exclusive focus on the West, some of which have leapt to the national fore: 
Southwest Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Air California, Alaska Airlines, Frontier Airlines. 
The twentieth century West is as much a product of the airplane as it is of the railroad or 
the automobile.
Aviation, as both technology and social force, offered a way to incorporate the 
cities and people of the distant West into the Eastern United States. T.A.T. marks the 
beginning of that moment.
–––––––––––––––––––
Transcontinental Air Transport has an important place in American history, sitting 
as it does at the juncture of aviation history and the history of the American West. The 
story of T.A.T. is well-documented in its own promotional circulars and internal 
memoranda; in the correspondence of its president, Clement Keys; and in the 
correspondence of Charles Lindbergh, chair of its technical committee. Over five 
chapters, this essay follows the chronological story of the Transcontinental Air 
Transport, from its founding through its construction and operation to the forced merger 
that ended its existence. 
Chapter 1 charts the development of aviation in America, from the Wright 
Brothers' 1903 flight at Kitty Hawk to Lindbergh's 1927 landing in Paris. These events 
and others like them spurred a widespread "air-mindedness" about the potential of air 
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travel in the American public. Despite this enthusiasm, aviation still smacked of danger: 
The sky was the realm of daredevils and barnstormers in unreliable contraptions. 
Lindbergh represented a counterpoint to these daredevils: He was seen as daring, but 
never risky, and promoted aviation as a safe, modern technology. To understand T.A.T., 
we must first understand the world from which it emerged. 
Chapter 2 discusses the airline's founding. Keys sought to harness Americans' 
air-mindedness and translate it into reality. His correspondence, private writings, and 
memoranda offer insight into how he thought about a national, transcontinental 
passenger airline at a time when airlines were small, local, and directed at carrying mail. 
From the beginning, Keys sought to build broad support for passenger aviation by 
recruiting trusted public figures. He persuaded Charles Lindbergh to join the venture, 
and the directors that Keys brought together to serve on the airline's board came from 
diverse backgrounds—different industries, different cities. 
Chapter 3 chronicles the construction of T.A.T. Facing a nation with few airports 
and little infrastructure for national air travel, T.A.T. built the infrastructure necessary for 
its activities almost entirely from scratch. Simultaneously, T.A.T. strove to build a mental 
infrastructure, a new way for the American public to understand air travel. The 
construction of the air route is inextricable from the construction of the airline's public 
image. Each process supported the other: Passengers would not fly along an unsafe 
route, so the airline took extra steps to make its operation safer than those of airmail 
lines. In national reach, logistical complexity, and technological requirements, this 
undertaking had precedent only in the late 19th-century construction of the 
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transcontinental railroads. It took more than a year of this work before the airline was 
prepared to fly passengers.
Chapter 4 follows the rise and fall of the airline's fortunes. The 48-hour-
celebration that marked the start of passenger service in July of 1929 was, in many 
ways, the high point of the airline's short life. The promotional shine quickly faded. The 
airline failed to attract as many passengers as Keys had hoped it would and its planes 
routinely flew half-empty. The crash of a T.A.T. plane in September dampened 
passenger demand, as did the stock market crash in October of 1929. By the end of its 
first year, T.A.T. was losing money on every flight, and its financial position was no 
longer sustainable.
Chapter 5, the essay's coda, discusses the airline's end and its legacy. For many 
Americans, the nature of air travel—the airplane's speed and altitude above the Earth—
made the country feel smaller. T.A.T.'s transcontinental reach was especially important 
in the West, where air travel put the cities and destinations of the West within reach of 
Eastern businessmen and tourists. These ideas—incorporation, interconnection—each 
outlasted the airline and appeared in aviation advertisements again and again over the 
following two decades. 
Over the first half of the twentieth century, the duration of a transcontinental 
journey shrank ever-shorter: It took forty-eight hours to cross the country, then thirty-six, 
twenty, thirteen, ten. In the 1960s, the introduction of commercial jet travel shrunk the 
country yet again, shortening transcontinental flights to five hours.  But even as 16
Lindbergh's button summoned the future, it recalled the past. Sixty years before he 
 Davies, Airlines, 670.16
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pushed it, in 1869, two crews from the Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads met in 
the Utah desert to drive the final spike of the first transcontinental railroad, uniting the 
country as it had never been united before.  17
Lindbergh's button, sitting as it does between these moments, contained the 
seeds of the future, harvested from the dreams of the past. With its depression, a new, 
smaller, faster world was created. We live today in the shadow of that moment, in a 
world birthed from a button. 
 "The Pacific Railroad," The New York Times, 12 May 1869: 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers The 17
New York Times (1851-2006), 02 Apr. 2010.
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1. The Rise of Airmindedness, or: "First within the continents."
A Scotchman and his wife were spending a vacation at the shore near an aviation field. 
One day the couple went over to the field and asked: "How mooch do you charge for the 
ride?" "Fifteen apiece [$200 apiece] for ten minutes," was the reply. 
After much arguing they reached an agreement: should the passengers speak even once 
during the trip the fare would be fifty dollars [$650]; if they kept silent, it would be free. 
The couple got in and were soon in the air. Up they went to ten thousand feet then came 
a loop-the-loop—and not a word. A vertical bank, a tail slip and a nose dive brought no 
sound. 
In despair, the pilot landed and said to the Scotchman, "Well, you win." "But there was 
once when I nearly spoke," replied the passenger. "When was that?" was the question. 
"When my wife dropped out."
— "The Price He Paid," Harper's Monthly Magazine, 1922 18
It is a hard, cold, calculating job to turn the air into a medium of commerce.
— C. M. Keys, on the prospects of commercial aviation in the United States, 1925 19
In 1903, on a sandy barrier island off the coast of North Carolina, two brothers 
flung an improbable invention into the air, where it wobbled, steadied, and supported 
itself and its cargo on nothing at all. The Wright Flyer soared over the dunes of Kitty 
Hawk for twelve long seconds before it fell back to the earth, in a flight that proved the 
feasibility of manned heavier-than-air flying craft and opened a new frontier of 
exploration: the sky.
Over the next two decades, the technology that the Wright brothers midwifed at 
Kitty Hawk was developed and advanced by countless inventors and boosters. It quickly 
found a place in the national consciousness.  But aviation was seen as the realm of 20
risk-takers, barnstormers, daredevils: An extreme sport not appropriate for the general 
public. This was the world before Transcontinental Air Transport. Investors like C. M. 
 "The Price He Paid," Harper's Monthly Magazine, Dec. 1922: 134. http://harpers.org/archive/, 22 Feb. 18
2010. Prices in this essay have been translated into 2010 dollars using the inflation calculator offered by 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The equivalent prices are presented in parenthesis or brackets. See: 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
 Clement M. Keys, memo to The Independent, 03/05/1926. NASM Keys, box 22, folder 5.19
 The story of early American aviation has been told by many people and in many places. This section 20
endeavors not to recapitulate their work, but to briefly summarize the decades before Lindbergh's flight.
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Keys and Daniel Guggenheim sought to tilt aviation away from spectacle and towards 
reliable use, but it was Charles Lindbergh who, with an improbable flight across three 
thousand miles of ocean, demonstrated the potential of aviation to connect distant 
places and ignited a new fascination with the technology of flight. Lindbergh's national 
air tour the following year introduced Americans to a new, safer, domesticated version of 
flight and opened the door to passenger aviation. This chapter traces the interplay 
between aviation's technological and social sides and follows the arc from danger to 
domestication.
The Wrights' accomplishment seemed so wildly impossible that it was at first 
disbelieved.  They sent news of their accomplishment—four flights that day, the last 21
and longest of which was nearly a minute—to their parents in Dayton, Ohio. Their 
parents were were thrilled. The newspapers yawned. The telegraph editor at one of the 
Dayton papers breezily dismissed the flight. "Fifty-seven seconds, hey? If it had been 
fifty-seven minutes then it might have been a news item."  The public proof came five 22
years later, in 1908, in front of a crowd of Army officers and newspapermen on a parade 
ground outside of Washington, DC. "When the plane first rose, the crowd's gasp of 
astonishment was not alone at the wonder of it," wrote Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., in a 
report to his father, President Roosevelt, "but because it was so unexpected."  The 23
following year, The Wright Company was founded, and the brothers turned to building 
and selling airplanes.
 Fred C. Kelly, The Wright Brothers. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943.) 116. Scientists 21
and physicists, notably Simon Newcomb, had published numerous articles in the popular media proving 
that heavier-than-air flight was impossible, as it violated the laws of physics.
 Qtd. in Kelly, Wright Brothers, 10722
 Qtd. in Kelly, Wright Brothers, 227.23
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Entrepreneurs were quick to latch on to aviation's commercial potential. In 1911, 
three years after the Wrights' public demonstration, a pilot named Cal Rodgers set out 
on the first transcontinental flight. Rodgers' flight was a corporate gimmick sponsored by 
the Armour Meat Packing Company of Chicago and the plane was named the Vin Fiz 
Flyer after the company's new grape soft drink. It took Rodgers 49 days to travel the 
four thousand miles between New York and Los Angeles. Thousands of Americans 
gathered to see Rodgers and his airplane at each of his more than 70 stops, and the 
flight made him a national celebrity, but there was little practical about his trip. The Flyer 
was slow, dangerous, and unreliable—no challenge to the trains that took a mere week 
to cross the country.24
The airplane's military potential was realized during World War I. Airplanes were 
unique in their ability to pierce the dark clouds of war that loomed over Europe in 1914, 
giving commanders and tacticians new views of battlefields and offering new methods 
of attack. The demands of warfare incubated aviation technology, encouraging the 
development of faster, more powerful, and more reliable airplanes; the war also swelled 
the ranks of trained pilots. Following the armistice in 1918, American airfields were 
flooded with war-surplus airplanes. Many freshly discharged pilots turned to 
barnstorming. Barnstormers performed mock dogfights and aerial stunts, but also 
offered short rides—five dollars for five minutes, giving people the chance to see their 
hometown from the air or just to experience flight. Each short ride built up public air-
mindedness, passenger by passenger.25
 Daniel L. Rust, Flying Across America: The Airline Passenger Experience. (Norman, OK: University of 24
Oklahoma P, 2009.) 5-7
 David T. Courtwright, Sky as Frontier: Adventure, Aviation, and Empire. (College Station, TX: Texas 25
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The first enduring practical use for aviation was airmail. After a series of 
experimental runs, the U.S. Post Office launched America's first regular airmail service 
in 1918. In Airlines and Air Mail, historian F. Robert van der Linden argues that 
"American commercial aviation was largely the creation of the federal government," 
which indirectly subsidized the fledgling industry through airmail contracts offered by the 
Post Office. The Post Office invested public funds in aviation in the interest of improving 
its service, particularly the speed of the mail. In 1919, recognizing that the "time savings 
afforded by the speed of aircraft could be realized only over long distances," the Post 
Office opened an airmail route between New York and Chicago. By 1920, the airmail 
route bridged the continent, connecting San Francisco and New York. By 1925, the Air 
Mail Service was "a flourishing government enterprise... proving every day and night 
that aviation was no longer the realm of the foolhardy, but a viable, though still infant, 
industry."  Airmail was a sober counterweight to the spectacle of barnstormers and 26
offered a permanence that they lacked.
Whether practical or spectacular, the seeming miracle of flight captured the 
public imagination. "What more astounding romance could there be than the story of 
Icarus' dream and Leonardo's patient diagrams, and then that triumphant leap into the 
air by the modest and undiscourageable Wrights?" asked Harper's Monthly Magazine in 
1926. "It is as a symbol of persistent human will that the airplane has its highest 
meaning for us; long chained, like Prometheus, to the earth, we have freed ourselves at 
 van der Linden, Airlines and Air Mail, 3-8.26
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last, and now we can look the skylark in the face."  To understand flight was to see the 27
world in a new way, a perspective termed air-mindedness. 
Air-mindedness emerged from the awe people felt when they first saw 
demonstrations of heavier-than-air flight: "Airplane flight was 'miraculous,' 'inhuman,' 
'occult,' or most commonly a 'miracle.'" To be air-minded "meant having enthusiasm for 
airplanes, believing in their potential to better human life, and supporting aviation 
development," writes historian Joseph Corn in The Winged Gospel, his history of air-
mindedness.  While the air-minded could attend air shows, follow Rodgers' flight, send 28
letters by airmail—even go up for a short ride themselves—it was rare that they used 
traveled as passengers aboard airplanes. The essential contradiction of early aviation is 
that even while everyone, it seems, wanted to fly, relatively few people actually flew. As 
historian Robert Wohl has written:
In comparison with other technologies, such as electricity, the telephone, the automobile, 
the cinema, or the radio, the airplane had little or no immediate or direct impact on the 
way that most people lived their lives; yet its invention nonetheless inspired an 
extraordinary outpouring of feeling and gave rise to utopian hopes or gnawing fears.29
Public feelings towards early aviation resembled contemporary feelings towards space 
flight: Each flight was a thrilling yet distant prospect and something one was unlikely to 
experience personally. The technology seemed limitless and each new aviation 
success, each novel use, reinforced popular beliefs in air-mindedness. In the spring of 
1927, a lone airmail pilot, with a single flight, caught Americans' attention and caused 
interest in aviation to climb even higher.
 Will Durant, "Is Progress a Delusion?" Harper's Monthly Magazine, Nov. 1926: 742-751. http://27
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Charles Lindbergh took off from a Long Island airfield on May 20, 1927, to 
attempt a transatlantic flight. Like so many Americans, Lindbergh was air-minded: He 
believed that airplanes could carry more than airmail and his flight was partly inspired, 
he later wrote, by his desire to establish aviation "as a common means of transport."  30
During the flight, he wrote, he came to see his airplane as "a lens focused on the future, 
a forerunner of the mechanisms that would conquer time and space." Eventually, 
Lindbergh believed, the airline would come to replace the railroad.  Lindbergh 31
succeeded in his attempt: Thirty-three-and-a-half hours after he took off from Long 
Island, the wheels of the Spirit of St. Louis bumped down on French soil at Le Bourget 
Airport, just outside of Paris. "Lindbergh Does It!" blared The New York Times in a three-
line banner headline across its front page (see Figure 2).  "American Eagle Swoops 32
Down From Inky Sky," read the front page of The Atlanta Constitution.  The excitement 33
was palpable: Lindbergh was catapulted into the public eye and his name, life story, and 
deeds became instantly familiar to almost every American. Constant radio, newspaper, 
and film coverage made Lindbergh the best-known American of the late 1920s—the 
country's first media darling.
In order to make the most of the aviation frenzy that Lindbergh ignited, the 
Guggenheim Fund asked him to undertake a three-month-long national air tour "for the 
primary purpose of stimulating popular interest in the use of air transport." The 
 Charles Lindbergh, Autobiography of Values. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jonanovich, 1976.) 70.30
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Guggenheim Fund was a not-for-profit investment fund whose goal was "to make our 
people air-minded and to demonstrate that flight could be and was a safe, practical 
method of transportation, that pilots could adhere to schedules and that distance could 
be divorced from time." Interest in Lindbergh's flight, the fund's trustees hoped, would 
stimulate the use of air services such as airmail or aerial photography, directly 
supporting the industry, and that it would translate into support for airport construction.  34
Lindbergh spent his aerial tour trying "to convince everyone who would listen that 
aviation had a brilliant future."  Everyone did: Americans turned out in droves. Most 35
Americans lived within fifty miles of his route; one-quarter of the American population—
an unprecedented thirty million people—saw him in person.  Lindbergh flew the Spirit 36
of St. Louis, the same plane he had taken across the Atlantic, more than 22,350 miles, 
stopping at 82 cities and delivering 147 speeches.  37
If earlier iterations of air-mindedness built on vague utopianism, Lindbergh turned 
air-mindedness upside down by demonstrating aviation's concrete uses. As The New 
York Times wrote a year after his transatlantic flight, "when the excitement had died 
down a stark fact remained—the airplane had been proved as a practical means of 
communication over long distances."  This use was bound up in the very structure of 38
Lindbergh's tour as he hopped from town to town. He gave speeches, dedicated 
airports, and allowed Americans to bask in his celebrity, then zipped to the next town or 
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city to repeat the process. The only way he could visit the entire country was by air. 
Lindbergh wasn't just painting an image of the future—he was living it.
Air-mindedness was a national phenomenon, a fact that Lindbergh's tour threw 
into sharp relief. He was a constant media presence after his transatlantic flight and his 
actions, no matter how small or quotidian, were recounted in newspapers, in 
magazines, in newsreels, making him a household name and a national brand. To share 
in his celebrity was to share in a national experience, similar to that of print capitalism. 
Benedict Anderson has written: "These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected 
through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo the 
nationally imagined community."  Now, fellow-participators could be connected to each 39
other through national celebrities like Lindbergh, growing the embryo and reinforcing the 
idea of a nationally imagined community. 
From this national platform, Lindbergh pushed Americans to build new airports or 
improve existing ones. While his tour had overtones of nationalism, his message was 
solidly local. Domestic infrastructure, he contended, would be key to the development of 
aviation. "It seemed obvious to me," Lindbergh wrote decades later, "that the 
development of airlines would be made in three stages. First within the continents; then 
between the continents; finally across the oceans from hemisphere to hemisphere."  40
He had become famous for flying across an ocean, yes, but if aviation was to benefit 
Americans, it had to be local and accessible: It had to start in their backyards and grow 
up from there. "I believe," Lindbergh wrote, "that the best way to promote aeronautics in 
a given locality is to establish a well-equipped airport. The city will then be visited 
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 44.39
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frequently by aircraft, thus allowing its citizens to become accustomed to the sight and 
performance of these modern means of transport."  As people gained personal 41
experience with aircraft, Lindbergh believed, they would become more comfortable with 
them, even comfortable enough to fly. The technology would seem less distant and 
more domestic. 
An airport could also connect a city to the rest of the nation—and to new 
economic opportunities. "Any city can work wonders with respect to its transportation 
problem," Lindbergh wrote, "by merely establishing an airport and using airplane 
services wherever possible." By delicately alluding to the 'transportation problem,' 
Lindbergh acknowledged the predicament faced by so many towns across the West: A 
western town's fortunes depended on its access to the railroad.  For many towns, 42
being consigned to a branch line meant diminished fortunes; being bypassed by the 
railroad meant almost certain death. 
In St. Louis, Lindbergh's hometown, the call for airports resonated. City leaders, 
perhaps still smarting from Chicago's victory in the 1850s to be the railroad hub for the 
West, "felt that the city must provide the facilities for an efficient air service if it is to be 
prominently placed on the map of aerial routes such as are certain to be designated 
within the near future," wrote The New York Times in 1928, a year after Lindbergh's 
transatlantic flight. Citizens in St. Louis believed that in order to maintain their economic 
dominance as a city of trade and a "gateway to the west and southwest," it was 
necessary to fully commit to the technology of flight. The construction of an airport was 
a duty of the municipality, carried out in its mission of civic promotion. Within a year,  
 Qtd. in Cleveland, America Fledges Wings, 96.41
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these citizens hoped, "air lines for passengers, mail, freight, and express will radiate 
from this city, supplementing, if not supplanting, the rail lines that now connect St. Louis 
with other parts of the country."  An airport, literally and cartographically, would connect 43
St. Louis to the rest of the America. By "supplanting" rail, it could also connect the city to 
the future.44
At St. Louis and in cities and towns across the country, Americans heeded 
Lindbergh's call for airports. By 1931, America had twice as many airports and landing 
fields as it did before his tour. A third of these were lighted, permitting operations at 
night. Moreover, by his very presence, Lindbergh changed how people regarded their 
local airports. He personified a new kind of aviation, one that was modern, safe, and 
reliable. (The way he carefully and methodically planned for his transatlantic flight had 
been widely reported, and Lindbergh, while daring, was not seen as a taker of 
unnecessary risks.) Local airports, long the realm of daredevils and wing-walkers, came 
to be seen as "gateways to a prosperous future."  Americans flocked to these 45
gateways: 1928 saw a 300% increase in applications for pilots' licenses and a 400% 
increase in the number of licensed aircraft.46
At the same time, Lindbergh’s tour changed how he saw his country. It filled out 
his mental map of America with images of real, discrete places and gave him a way to 
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weave unique local threads into a bolt of national cloth.  At the conclusion of his tour, 47
Lindbergh wrote, "the United States was represented by a new image in my mind. 
Instead of outlines on a paper map, I saw New England's valleys dotted by white 
villages, the crystal waters of Michigan's great lakes, Arizona's pastel deserts, Georgia's 
red cotton fields, the cascades and deep forests of the Oregon Northwest."  The 48
airplane's altitude positioned Lindbergh to see these places, but it was his geographic 
literacy that enabled him to understand and describe them.  Geographic literacy was 49
newly common among Americans. As historian Susan Schulten notes, "The early 
twentieth century brought a slow and steady stream of Americans into contact with 
maps and atlases. Geography was gradually becoming not just a school subject or a 
reference tool, but a cultural commodity as well."  Americans followed the battles of 50
World War I in atlases. They used gas station maps to navigate on road trips. Maps 
were especially handy for following record-breaking airplane flights, like Lindbergh's 
flight across the Atlantic or Admiral Richard Byrd's flight over the North Pole. Geography 
was doubly linked to air-mindedness: First, through the near-cartographic perspective of 
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an airplane's altitude, where, from above, the land looked like a map. And second, the 
airplane re-oriented popular understandings of space and distance. To fly was to be 
loosed from geography: For the first time, it was possible to travel as the crow flies. 
After his tour, it seemed as if aviation and Lindbergh were one and the same, so 
that to speak of a world made by air travel was to speak of a world made by Lindbergh 
himself, swept up and carried in his arms. Although Lindbergh was in many ways the 
father of American passenger aviation, although he opened the skies and called forth a 
new world, it is more accurate to see him as a fulcrum, a spark, a catalyst for the 
energetic acceptance of flight and a central lens that focussed the raw enthusiasm of 
the American public. He was heir to a broad social and technological legacy that began 
with the Wright Brothers at Kitty Hawk, developed at the nation's air shows and on 
flights like that of the Vin Fiz, matured in the skies above Europe and along airmail 
routes, and was nudged along by financial backers like the Guggenheim Fund. 
Lindbergh did what pilots do: He flew. But he did not fly alone.
On April 30, 1928, at the conclusion of his national tour, Lindbergh retired the 
Spirit of St. Louis, donating the airplane to the Smithsonian Institution.  He had flown 51
the airplane across an ocean and all over the country and it had been his companion for 
just over a year. When he left his plane in Washington, DC, he left also the idea that 
aviation was for aviators, lone men and women flying through the night in open-cockpit 
wood-and-fabric constructions. The airplanes of the future would carry a different type of 
men and women: passengers. Lindbergh had demonstrated that an airplane could be 
useful, that it could be flown without inordinate risk, and then brought his famous plane 
 Lindbergh, Autobiography, 96.51
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to the hometowns of millions of Americans—close enough to touch. In a way, Lindbergh 
brought aviation down to earth. And on the ground was exactly where C. M. Keys, 
aviation magnate, thought the industry should be.
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2. The Creation of an Airline, or: "90% of aviation is on the ground."
The building is probably so full of presidents that the novelty has worn off for the elevator 
boys. We doubt if they are much thrilled by C. M. Keys, a slight, quiet man who has 
offices on the fifteenth floor and who is president of a number of things, including the 
Curtiss Aircraft Corporation and, more recently, the corporation which plans to get 
travelers from here to Los Angeles in forty-eight hours by a series of plane and train 
rides. Mr. Keys looks like a teacher and, oddly enough, used to be one.
– The New Yorker's Talk of the Town, June 16, 1928 52
I am firmly convinced that the evolution of passenger transport will not follow exactly the 
course followed in the case of the airmail.
– Clement Keys, February 1929 53
Clement Keys believed that passengers were the future of the aviation industry. 
He was one of the few that did. The established airlines shunned passengers, viewing 
them as more expensive and more difficult to transport than airmail. Keys took a 
different tack. It was only a matter of time before some entrepreneur sought to capitalize 
on this gap in the marketplace, so why not him? He proceeded methodically, putting 
together a new company piece by piece. "90% of aviation is on the ground," he was 
fond of saying. Keys recruited Charles Lindbergh, brought together a diverse and 
talented board of directors, and raised millions of dollars in capital. (For images of Keys 
and Lindbergh, see Figure 1.) The company, Transcontinental Air Transport, was an 
experiment—an expertly prepared, well-financed experiment, but an experiment 
nonetheless. Keys' correspondence, speeches, and memoranda offer a window into the 
airline's founding. To look back at his early thoughts on T.A.T. is to see the world as he 
saw it and to understand aviation as he did.
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Keys was born in Canada in 1876 and attended the University of Toronto. He 
graduated in 1897 at the age of 21 and briefly taught classics; in 1901, he moved to 
New York City and became a reporter for The Wall Street Journal.  In 1903, he became 54
the Journal's railroad editor, and developed an affinity for the "well-organized, vertically 
integrated, railroad-holding companies," whose directors he saw as "true industry 
pioneers who built huge, well-run enterprises that benefited the economy and served 
the public interest."  In 1905, he became the financial editor for World's Work, a 55
monthly magazine that celebrated American life and "the cheerful spirit of men who do 
things."  He stayed with the magazine until 1911, when he founded his own investment 56
consulting firm, C. M. Keys & Company. Through his work there, he developed 
connections with many of Wall Street's prominent financiers. 
Keys caught the aviation bug in 1919, when he traveled to Europe with the 
American Aviation Commission to examine the state of European aviation in the wake of 
World War I. As a financier, he had revived the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company; 
on his return to the United States, Keys purchased a controlling interest in Curtiss and 
brought the company back to profitability. He made the cause of aviation his own and 
aimed to emulate the organizational and managerial strategies of his beloved railroads 
by applying their methods to the fledgling aviation industry.  By 1927, Keys sat at the 57
center of a small empire built of interrelated, vertically-integrated aviation businesses, all 
of which he headed or controlled. A list prepared in 1930 of Keys's corporate 
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involvement listed 26 companies, involved in areas as diverse as aviation finance, 
import/export, pilot training, airplane design and construction, airmail delivery, and the 
construction of gyroscopes.  58
Keys was forward-looking in the way that businessmen often are: To profit from 
the future, you must first predict it. He staked his claim on aviation in 1925 with the 
unequivocal statement that "organized commercial aviation will win." In that year, he 
looked ahead, as if from the cockpit of an airplane, and predicted that:
The scattered individual flyers who have been making a living will probably diminish as 
the supply of cheap war equipment disappears from the market. Organized transportation 
companies will take their place. It will take a year or two of organized flying to determine 
at what rates and under what conditions, year in and year out, the movement of traffic 
can be maintained profitably. This determination involves the use of a lot of experimental 
equipment, the training of men and the establishment of efficient and cheap terminal 
services. It is my judgement, which I have backed with capital, that the verdict at the end 
of a year or two will be that the thing can be done.59
This was a strong statement in 1925, when aviation seemed a trifle and there were 
three commercial operators in the entire country.  But Keys took a long view and saw 60
aviation not for what it was, but for what it could be. He doubted that organized aviation 
would be an immediate success, but if carefully planned and properly run, an airline 
might be able to succeed. It is especially significant that Keys—a financier, well-versed 
in risk—would note that he had backed these opinions with capital. He was not merely 
musing on the possibilities of aviation, but making a case for a new industry.
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What might this industry look like? The success of aviation, Keys wrote, "turns 
upon the ability to transport safely over long distances, in all kinds of weather, by day or 
by night, the tonnage that is available, at a cost that is not prohibitive."  This set of 61
criteria—so familiar to the contemporary pilot or passenger that they typically go without 
notice—reveal Keys to be a visionary. Before 1925, the commercial aviation industry 
was loosely organized and poorly regulated, composed largely of itinerant barnstormers 
in small, aging planes. They didn't fly long distances, avoided weather and darkness, 
and flew for show, not transport. The 1925 Kelly Act allowed the government to contract 
airmail services with private operators, and its passage caused a scramble to organize 
proper airlines flying modern equipment over fixed routes. The airmail lines were 
occasionally stymied by weather or darkness and their planes only needed to be safe 
enough that a single pilot could bail out before a crash. This was an inefficient approach 
and one that did not scale well to flying passengers. (Proposals that passengers be 
equipped with individual parachute were ultimately deemed unfeasible.) Airplanes would 
have to be made safer and more reliable if aviation was to be a consumer industry.
Keys's emphasis on affordability is especially revealing. He took a realistic view 
of air-mindedness. "Patriotism on the part of the public—in the form of a desire to see 
lots of airplanes flying in the United States—helps the promoter to promote," he wrote, 
"but it soon fades when it has to take the form of paying for service that does not pay 
the patriot in dollars and cents."  Awe, in other words, didn't pay the bills, and aviation 62
would have to be affordable if it were to succeed. Keys approached the question of cost 
as a businessman, not an engineer, by asking what consumers would pay for, not what 
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was possible. He may have been able to win passengers' confidence, but he would also 
have to win their wallets. Keys's criteria—safety, reliability, affordability—were tall 
demands, beyond the limits of aviation technology in 1925. Still, they would be his 
watchwords, and they would guide his thinking as he organized his aviation dealings.
If Keys was right, if airplanes became safer and more reliable and travel became 
more affordable, then he foresaw a bright future for aviation. 
If this conclusion is correct the real establishment of commercial aviation in the United 
States will take place about the year 1928. From that date its growth will be very rapid, for 
there is never any lack of capital, of men, or of material in the United States to carry 
forward any branch of transportation after the initial process of study and experiment has 
demonstrated its commercial feasibility. In that case it would be practically assured that 
within a reasonable time the United States will take its proper place among the air 
minded nations — and that, after all, is the thing we are striving at.63
Keys's view was informed by history: The railroad and the automobile, both of which 
had begun as awkward, experimental technologies, quickly developed into large, multi-
million dollar consumer industries. If the uses of the airplane could be riddled out and 
demonstrated, Keys believed, then business and capital would follow. Despite his 
cautions and caveats, Keys was air-minded. He had become an American citizen in 
1924 and believed that airplanes would change the country for the better. An airplane 
was, in some sense, more than just a technology or a business opportunity, it was a 
way to prove the ascendancy of the United States to the rest of the world.
His suggestion of the year 1928 would prove prescient. Although Keys didn't yet 
know it, that was the year he would found a transcontinental passenger airline. It was 
something he had been considering for a long time. As early as 1925, Keys seemed to 
be thinking both about a transcontinental airline and about launching passenger service. 
After the 1925 Kelly Act provided for the transportation of airmail by Post Office 
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contractors, Keys founded National Air Transport, an airmail line, to bid for the New 
York-Chicago contract.  At the same time, N.A.T. courted Western Air Express, which 64
was bidding for the Chicago-San Francisco airmail contract, in the hopes that the two 
airlines could together enter a joint bid for the entire transcontinental route. Western's 
president declined the offer.  But the tantalizing idea of a transcontinental passenger 65
airline reappeared in 1926, when executives at the Pennsylvania Railroad approached 
Keys and N.A.T. with a proposal for a New York-Los Angeles air-rail line. Nothing seems 
to have come of that, either.  Regardless of when or where the idea originated, the 66
essential thing is this: For a man like Keys, steeped in the world of aviation, the next, 
unrealized step must have been to link the coasts.  On passenger aviation, Keys wrote: 67
"I believe that, while passenger transportation is still purely experimental and cannot be 
regarded as anything but that, it will arrive in time."  That time, he knew, was coming. 68
Could a transcontinental passenger airline be far off? It was in this state of mind that 
Keys regarded Lindbergh's famous 1927 flight.
As the world buzzed with news of Lindbergh's transatlantic triumph, Keys 
composed a letter to the young aviator, offering him a role, any role, in the creation of 
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"the first great passenger trunk line of the country."  Keys, a former newspaperman, 69
knew a good story when he saw one: Lindbergh was young, dashing, and had just 
become the face of aviation. Lindbergh had incredible name recognition and, Keys 
realized, could easily parlay his celebrity into a brand. Thus, it was important to Keys 
that Lindbergh be actively and centrally involved in the airline. Keys offered him "the 
Presidency or any official position which you may choose," at a salary of Lindbergh's 
choosing, with a board of directors of his composition, for an airline with his name on it: 
"Lindbergh National Lines, or some similar name to suit your wishes." Keys and his 
partners would "underwrite all of the capital that is necessary to carry on this 
enterprise."  The letter is dated June 14, 1927, the day after Lindbergh was received in 70
New York City with a ticker-tape parade in celebration of his transatlantic flight.  71
Lindbergh, awash in similar offers and requests for endorsement, did not respond to the 
letter. He may have been overwhelmed; he may not have been interested; he may not 
have taken the offer seriously. But Keys was interested, and Keys took Lindbergh 
seriously.
 Keys and Coffin to Lindbergh, 06/14/27, MSSA Lindbergh. Note that my chronology differs from that 69
established by van der Linden in "Airlines and Air Mail." Van der Linden points to the offer extended by the 
Pennsylvania Railroad in 1926 as the seed that contained T.A.T., then leaps forward two years to April of 
1928, when he writes that "Keys's ideas began to take shape." (See van der Linden, Airlines and Air Mail, 
38-43.) This narrative leap takes van der Linden past Lindbergh's flight, and Lindbergh returns in van der 
Linden's narrative only after T.A.T. has been formally incorporated. In my view, this 1927 letter to 
Lindbergh is the earliest definitive mention of the transcontinental airline that would become T.A.T. 
Further, Lindbergh's involvement in the airline from its beginning substantially changes our understanding 
of T.A.T.'s relationship with the public, as I argue in my next chapter.
 Keys and Coffin to Lindbergh, 06/14/27, MSSA Lindbergh. 70
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Two weeks later, Keys's lawyer, Chester Cuthell, reiterated the offer in a second 
letter to Lindbergh.  Lindbergh telephoned Cuthell on July 14 to decline the offer, but 72
he soon reconsidered and telephoned again on July 26 to talk further. The next day, in 
response to Lindbergh's concerns and after conferring with some of Keys's advisors, 
Cuthell sent Lindbergh a third letter, outlining a greatly revised plan for the company.
In the final schema, Lindbergh's managerial role in the company was greatly 
reduced, a recognition, Cuthell wrote, that the earlier proposals "would not be attractive 
to you because they would confine you too closely to the detailed task of operating a 
regular service."  Instead of an executive position, Lindbergh would focus on two 73
things: choosing equipment and studying possible routes.  Both involved flying. Where 74
before Keys and his cohort had sought to tempt Lindbergh with fame and wealth, they 
here took the opposite tack, offering him freedom to define his own place in the 
company. Cuthell assured Lindbergh that his position
would not tie you down to desk work or even the details of operations; that your work 
would be of a free lance character; it would be based primarily on development of new 
ideas and that you could bring into the organization whatever men you want to help you, 
either financially or personally.75
This was a quick—and clever—pivot from one offer to another, and Keys's willingness to 
accommodate Lindbergh's desires suggests how badly he wanted Lindbergh involved in 
the venture. Ultimately, Lindbergh "accepted an appointment as Chairman of the 
 Chester M. Cuthell, letter to Charles Lindbergh, 06/27/27. MSSA Lindbergh, MS325, series III, box 102, 72
folder 251.
 Chester M. Cuthell, letter to Charles Lindbergh, 07/27/27. MSSA Lindbergh, MS325, series III, box 102, 73
folder 251.
 Ibid. Cuthell assured Lindbergh his responsibilities would not extend to any of the following: 74
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management, purchase and disposal of incidental equipment, traffic solicitation, taxation and the many 
other details that are usually included under the heading of management."
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Technical Committee of the Transcontinental Air Transport in charge of all technical 
details."  The position allowed him wide latitude and real power to shape the airline—it 76
was no sinecure—and did not restrict ability to promote the general cause of aviation. 
Despite his celebrity, Lindbergh remained an airmail pilot thrust into the public 
eye by an improbable flight. He wore this fame heavily, doling it out a bit at a time, 
always to promote aviation. In a brief press release, he explained his reason for joining 
T.A.T.: "I believe the next important step in the progress of American aviation will be the 
inauguration of extensive passenger transportation, consequently, I have become 
actively identified with the Transcontinental Air Transport."  Lindbergh hoped, he wrote 77
years later, that a world interconnected by aviation would "increase human freedom 
[and] bring the peoples of the world together in understanding and peace. What could 
advance civilized progress more rapidly than fast communication?"  Lindbergh did not 78
rush into Keys's corporate arms. Before he joined T.A.T.—and it is one of the very few 
organizations he did join after his transatlantic flight—he had to be convinced that the 
move would somehow benefit aviation. Keys, for his part, regarded Lindbergh's 
involvement as a coup: "He is proud of having signed up Lindbergh and likes to talk 
about it," wrote The New Yorker.  Ultimately, both parties came away satisfied: 79
Lindbergh gained a job that would have a real impact on the development of aviation, 
and Keys gained a new figurehead for his airline. Important though Lindbergh was, the 
young pilot was just one piece in Keys's larger plan.
 Charles Lindbergh, statement on joining Transcontinental Air Transport, [1928]. MSSA Lindbergh, MS 76
325, series III, box 124, folder 508.
 Ibid.77
 Lindbergh, Autobiography, 41.78
 Thurber, "Lindbergh's Boss," The New Yorker. 79
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After securing Lindbergh's involvement, Keys and his associates spent the first 
few months of 1928 bringing together a board of directors.  Each man they recruited to 80
serve on the board—and the directors were all men—was chosen for a specific reason. 
The board was large and diverse, with 21 notable men drawn from many different 
sectors of American commercial life. Representatives of the Pennsylvania Railroad, 
Fred Harvey, and The Ford Motor Company all sat on the board, as did Lindbergh's 
backers. The board also included officers and directors of Keys's other corporations. 
Keys took the position of president.  By examining the composition of the board we can 81
better understand Keys's business strategies and the underpinnings of T.A.T.
General William W. Atterbury, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, had 
recently declared that the Pennsylvania would no longer be a railroad company but 
instead a comprehensive transportation provider.  Atterbury saw in T.A.T. the potential 82
to extend his railroad's reach past St. Louis, its western terminus, as well as the 
possibility to ally his railroad with the new technology of flight. The Pennsylvania 
Railroad purchased a 20% stake in T.A.T.  and two men from the Pennsylvania sat on 83
the board: Daniel M. Sheaffer, chief of passenger transportation, and Julien L. 
Eysmans, vice-president in charge of traffic.  The Atcheson, Topeka, and Santa Fe 84
Railway, T.A.T.'s transportation partner in the western half of the country, declined to 
invest in the airline; its directors were concerned that supporting alternative forms of 
 A full list of T.A.T.'s directors is included in Appendix 2.80
 Transcontinental Air Transport, "Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc," TAT Plane Talk Jan. 1929: 1-2. 81
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transportation would be a conflict of interest.  (The Santa Fe Railway was not 85
represented on T.A.T.'s board.) But the involvement of the Pennsylvania Railroad and 
the Santa Fe Railway demonstrated that other transportation companies took T.A.T. 
seriously, suggesting that passengers should too. "The big transportation systems with 
their huge investments of capital do not rush into new schemes with enthusiasm," wrote 
The San Francisco Chronicle. Their participation meant that passenger aviation had 
"reached a substantial point in development and has come to stay."86
Lindbergh's transatlantic flight had been underwritten by three men: Harold Bixby, 
Henry Breckinridge, and Harry Knight, all of St. Louis. Lindbergh did not join the board
—he was not interested in administration—but his three backers did. They brought with 
them backgrounds in law and investment banking. They were also wealthy members of 
the St. Louis social elite and their association with the venture added a certain luster. 
Men of means chose their investments carefully: If Lindbergh's financial backers 
endorsed the airline, that was a sign that the airline was a prudent venture.
Fred Harvey, the famous dining chain of the Midwest and Southwest, was now 
managed by Ford Harvey, the son of its eponymous founder.  Ford's son, Freddy, was 87
an aviation enthusiast: He owned his own plane, had flown in World War I and knew 
Charles Lindbergh, albeit tangentially, through the air corps.  Freddy also knew 88
Lindbergh's backers through the flying club in St. Louis, and, like them, believed that 
 Fried, Appetite for America, 296.85
 "What It Means When Railroads Join Hands With Air Transport," The San Francisco Chronicle, 17 May 86
1928. 
 In keeping with the wishes of the original Fred Harvey, Fried notes, the company was called Fred 87
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passenger air travel was the next big thing. In April of 1928, Knight mentioned that his 
St. Louis brokerage house was helping raise capital for a transcontinental passenger 
airline. Freddy saw an opportunity to expand the family business: Fred Harvey ran every 
dining car on the Santa Fe Railway, the dining room at every station stop, and resort 
hotels throughout the Southwest. Now it was possible for "the first meals served in the 
air to be Fred Harvey meals."  This was thrilling for Freddy, and probably also for Keys. 89
Fred Harvey meals were nationally known, the standard for out-of-home prepared food 
around the country. Fred Harvey became the airline's caterer and Freddy got a seat on 
the board. Freddy was also, along with William Vanderbilt, one of two private investors 
in the company's original stock. Like Keys, he backed his judgement with capital.
The Ford Motor Company, which supplied the airline's planes, was represented 
on the board by William B. Mayo, the company's chief engineer. This broke with Keys's 
vision of a perfect, vertically-integrated corporation, but the airplane manufacturers 
within his aviation empire had no planes suitable for passenger operations. Associating 
with Ford Motor also gained Keys the Ford brand. Keys was not well-known among 
Americans—not a household name in the way that Charles Lindbergh, Fred Harvey, or 
Henry Ford were—and it sometimes seems as if he were collecting brands. Americans 
may not yet have heard of Transcontinental Air Transport, but they had heard of 
Lindbergh, of Harvey and Ford, and of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Santa Fe 
Railway. By building his company on established, recognized figures and brands, Keys 
built an easy way for the public to understand what the airline was and why they could 
trust it.
 Fried, Appetite for America, 296.89
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Building a diverse, interlocking board was a way to gain the allegiance and 
expertise of men already involved in diverse fields: transportation, catering, airline 
operations, airplane construction. It was also an endorsement of Keys's vision. To 
outside investors, the board demonstrated that T.A.T. was serious about its undertaking. 
Investors would judge the venture based on those who affiliated themselves with it, so 
Keys felt that the "Board of Directors and officers must be strong, because their 
character is the only thing that would justify offering and buying these shares. The 
Board must include: character, experience, public reputation, financial standing beyond 
reproach."  90
But by "strong," Keys meant that the company's directors must be upstanding, 
not that they be powerful. He intended to keep the board away from much of the work of 
the company and structured the board so that he could control it through agents of his 
aviation empire. Thirteen of the board's twenty-one seats—a majority—were filled by 
Keys's men. In a letter to Paul Henderson, one of his confidants and vice-president of 
National Air Transport, Keys's airmail line, Keys noted that "if we are not able between 
us to shape the general policies of the Transcontinental, I think that it will be our own 
fault almost entirely."  The board thus gave Keys both the appearance of wide-ranging 91
support and the latitude to operate according to his best judgement.
There was also a geographic element to the board's composition.  Directors 92
were distributed roughly along the transcontinental route: Keys in New York, the officers 
of the Pennsylvania Railroad in the mid-Atlantic, Lindbergh's backers in St. Louis, 
 Clement M. Keys, hand-written notes, [04/1928]. NASM Keys, box 23, folder 30.90
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Freddy Harvey in Kansas City, his company Fred Harvey across the southwest, and, in 
California, Thomas B. Eastland, a director of the Aviation Corporation of California. This 
way, financial and material support for the airline was distributed along its route. The 
airline was national, but also local wherever it went.
The aviation field was new and unsettled. Ideas moved like clouds across the 
sky, shifting, merging, forming and re-forming. Over a series of months, Keys shaped 
T.A.T., translating it from an idea into a corporation. His managerial style was 
methodical and detail-oriented, ideal for taking a big idea—Lindbergh National Air Lines
—and giving it practical form. On May 14, 1928, Transcontinental Air Transport was 
officially incorporated. With this event, wrote Lindbergh, "the time of dreaming and 
talking had passed. We were faced with the practical problem of creating a safe and 
attractive service that would eventually make money."  The airline, Lindbergh 93
recognized, would have to attract passengers.
 Lindbergh, Autobiography, 102.93
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3. The Construction of an Airline, or: "The day we are properly ready."
As the War gave aviation its first great impetus, so did the War give it a flavor. For a 
decade after the last young ace drained a flask of Scotch and jumped into the cockpit of 
his bomber, the fine flavor of recklessness hung about this new-born sport and industry of 
the air. As a result, while the world's store of adventure and romance was measurably 
renewed, very little was added to the world's knowledge of transport. For transport is a 
different matter altogether. Transport is not created in a series of gallant, superhuman 
bursts, but by sustained and sober effort. There is not time, figuratively or literally, for 
flasks of Scotch in the transport business.
– Fortune magazine, April 1930 94
Air travel in the United States is soon to emerge from the spasmodic era of the thermos 
bottle, the cheese sandwich and the leather jacket. Passengers' safety and comfort are, 
above all else, to command the attention of the newly formed Transcontinental Air 
Transport, Inc., which announced its plans last week.
—Time magazine, May 1928 95
Hardly any American airlines offered passenger service in the early part of the 
20th century. Profit lay in federal airmail contracts, not passenger fares. Compared to 
airmail rates, passenger fares were worth significantly less per pound. Airplanes were 
small, often lacking space for anything more than a pilot and a mailbag. If a passenger 
could be accommodated, he or she might sit in a second cockpit, open to the elements, 
or in a small cabin surrounded by bags of airmail. Airlines regarded passengers as 
outright nuisances. As the old railroad saying went, "freight doesn't complain."  96
Passengers got hot, or cold, or hungry. They expected safety; worse than that, they 
expected comfort. Several airmail lines raised their passenger fares to discourage 
bookings. If they carried passengers at all, it was generally on an ad hoc basis. The 
mood was not welcoming. Passengers were "provided with flying suit and parachute, 
often asked to carry a sack of mail on their laps, and sometimes dumped at some point 
 "Air & Rail," Fortune Magazine, Apr. 1930: 80-87.94
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 Fried, Appetite for America, 40.96
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along the route to make way for the priority mail."  Early airports offered minimal 97
passenger facilities, notes architectural critic Alastair Gordon. They were industrial 
places, their buildings all "shabby hangars or shacks for servicing mail planes."  In this 98
inhospitable atmosphere, the determined passenger could travel by air—but few 
passengers were so determined.
Transcontinental Air Transport would be different. Keys was a contemporary of 
men like Fred Harvey and George Pullman, who had built entire companies by selling 
excellent passenger service.  What they had done for rail, T.A.T. would do for the air: 99
Provide a seamless, luxurious travel experience. With the airline's corporate structure in 
place, Keys turned to building a passenger airline. This chapter chronicles the 
construction of the airline's physical infrastructure and of its public image. The airline's 
mission to serve passengers influenced every step it took. Physical infrastructure—
airfields, radio towers, weather stations—had to be built almost entirely from scratch, a 
monumental undertaking, surpassed only in scale, scope, and reach by the construction 
of the transcontinental railroads sixty years earlier. But construction wasn't enough: The 
airline also had to convince potential passengers that flying was a safe and enjoyable 
way to travel.
It is tempting to view the airplane as a beast entirely loosed from the surly bonds 
of Earth, as a lone machine that can range across the sky. But landings must 
accompany take-offs, and each must be made at prepared air fields. The airplane's 
infrastructural needs are as fixed and necessary as those of the railroad or automobile
 Davies, Airlines, 39, 62.97
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—they are merely less visible. Like its gravity-bound compatriots, the airplane could not 
bridge the country without a base of infrastructure, and yet aviation infrastructure was 
precisely what the country lacked.
Construction began not with building airports but with building capital. The 
company initially raised three million dollars ($38 million). Keys then decided to raise an 
additional two million dollars ($25 million) for "unknown contingencies." "Contingencies 
have been the most important thing that I have encountered in all my life and I always 
expect lots of them," he explained.  By the time the company was organized it had five 100
million dollars ($63 million) in capital. Building the airline would be expensive and Keys 
expected initial operating losses as travelers adjusted to the idea of air travel. The 
airline needed to have a store of reserves to carry it through lean times.
The airline's founders knew that they wanted a transcontinental route. As they 
selected station stops, several factors guided their work. "It was apparent that the route 
should be laid out as directly as possible, in consistence with areas of population and 
safety and regularity of operation," Lindbergh wrote in 1930.  T.A.T. would stop in 101
centers of population, so as to maximize its base of potential passengers. Wichita, in 
Kansas, and St. Louis and Kansas City, in Missouri, were all included on the route, even 
though their inclusion made the route less direct. It was also important that the route be 
safe and comfortable—passengers were rightly assumed to have a much lower 
tolerance for turbulence and rough weather than trained pilots. The airline used 
government weather records to determine which routes would "offer the least difficulties 
 Keys, "What the Rail-Air Business Means," NASM Keys.100
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from the point of view of weather, head winds, sudden storms, fogs, et cetera."  The 102
final route avoided mountain ranges, which caused turbulence, were prone to bad 
weather, and were difficult for even veteran pilots to navigate. This was why passengers 
left New York by train—it was easy to travel through the Allegheny Mountains by train, 
but difficult and dangerous to fly over them.  In the Southwest, T.A.T. chose a route 103
over flat stretches of desert and over the low western mountains to take advantage of 
relatively clear weather and minimal turbulence.  Wherever possible, T.A.T. aimed to 104
fly through smooth skies.
The ideal route for weather and passengers was then compared and 
"coordinated with a study of rail schedules on both lines of the Santa Fe Railroad," so 
that passengers could make their sleeper train connections each night.  Some stops 105
were selected with eye to the operation of the entire system. For example, Waynoka, 
Oklahoma, and Clovis, New Mexico, were chosen in preference to other cities because 
"a more perfectly balanced flying time between the eastern and western divisions can 
be maintained over the Waynoka-Clovis route."  Safety, reliability, and affordability, 106
those same watchwords that Keys first elucidated in 1925, guided the translation of the 
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transcontinental idea into an actual route and schedule. When the route was finalized in 
February of 1929, there were fourteen stops (see Figure 4).107
Unfortunately, there were not fourteen airports. "In a preliminary survey by 
Colonel Lindbergh it was learned there were no existing airports suitable for use of TAT 
planes."  The airline responded to this daunting task with a methodical approach and 108
built fourteen airports over a period of six months.  It cleared and graded land, built 109
runways and terminal facilities, installed lighting, and, in some cases, built roads to the 
nearest town. At each airport, T.A.T. built a smartly appointed passenger station with 
waiting rooms, restrooms, and a newsstand. The stations in Columbus, Ohio, and 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, each also housed a restaurant and offices for T.A.T. The 
influence of Fred Harvey and the Santa Fe Railway was evident in Albuquerque, where 
the T.A.T. station was "done in the old Spanish style of architecture familiar to the 
region," all adobe and tile (see Figure 5). The Columbus station was a handsome two-
story building clad in cream-colored brick.   T.A.T. bragged that its stations were "equal 110
in comfort and convenience to a railroad passenger station."  Clearly, this was a shift 111
from the shabby, industrial hangars used by mail planes. By building on the established 
architectural type of the railroad station, already well-known to passengers, T.A.T. aimed 
to normalize air travel and make it seem familiar.
 "Terminal Facilities and Their Development," TAT Plane Talk. The cities on the route were: Columbus, 107
Ohio; Indianapolis, Indiana; St. Louis, Missouri; Kansas City, Missouri; Wichita, Kansas; Waynoka, 
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Cities were eager to be on the T.A.T. route—so eager, in fact, that the San 
Francisco Examiner, in its coverage of the airline, felt that the city had been snubbed 
and "wrote its story around the resentment of San Francisco, that Los Angeles was 
chosen as a Western Terminal."  The Examiner, offended that San Francisco-bound 112
passengers would "be forced to go to Los Angeles first," called for a bifurcated route 
with terminals in both cities, or, if that was not possible, the "establishment of similar 
service with other railroads and airplane companies direct between San Francisco and 
New York." Milo F. Kent, the chairman of San Francisco's Supervisors' Airport 
Committee, told the Examiner that "our commercial value and importance demand our 
being given direct service in the establishment of such a line. We are a force to be 
reckoned with." James Rolph, San Francisco's mayor, and Frank A. Flynn, 
superintendent of the San Francisco Municipal Airport, concurred with Kent, the paper 
reported.  This resentment is historically interesting because it mirrors the bitter 113
campaigns waged by cities for the attention of railroad companies. In the 1840s and 
1850s, Chicago and St. Louis jockeyed to be the focus of the railroads in the 
Midwest;  later in the century, Tacoma and Seattle vied to be the western terminus of 114
Northern Pacific Railroad's northern transcontinental route. City leaders may not have 
been sure what to make of aviation, but they didn't want to be left out.
Equally interesting is how T.A.T. responded to San Francisco’s complaints: They 
sent in Charles Lindbergh. Keys recognized that Lindbergh's celebrity could be a 
powerful diplomatic force. "Colonel Lindbergh was dispatched to the West Coast to 
 Thomas B. Eastland, letter to Clement M. Keys, 05/17/1928. NASM Keys, box 23, folder 6.112
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endeavor to smooth out the relationship between the T.A.T. and the city and press of 
San Francisco," wrote Keys.  T.A.T. vice-president Paul Henderson recommended 115
appeasing the Examiner with a vague promise for future service after T.A.T. worked out 
the technical problems of night flying.  While in San Francisco, Lindbergh "had 116
interviews with the Mayor and Commissioners and the Press and apparently 
accomplished the object desired, as the attitude of the Examiner since that time has 
been much broader," Keys wrote.  But T.A.T. still planned on using Los Angeles as its 117
western terminus. Lindbergh's visit, wrote Henderson, was nothing more than a "song 
and dance."118
Airports were the most visible part of the network, but T.A.T. invested significant 
resources behind the scenes to ensure passenger comfort and safety. The airline built a 
coast-to-coast radio network, which its pilots used to stay in touch with ground stations 
and to navigate along the route.  Radio-equipped planes were new and radio 119
navigation promised to be safer than navigating by landmarks on the ground, as airmail 
pilots had done for years. On the ground, a teletype network connected airports, 
weather stations, and radio towers to each other. T.A.T. employees could use it to send 
weather reports and use it for "plane dispatching, ordering plane movements, [and the] 
transmission of reports, reservation requests and inter-company messages."  120
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Essentially, the airline replicated the type of communications network that allowed the 
railroads to function as large, integrated companies. 
Radio and teletype made national air travel possible, but the airline's weather 
bureau made it safe. The fickle nature of weather had long bedeviled aviation: Pilots 
routinely took off without any knowledge of conditions at their destination and could only 
improvise a response if weather deteriorated en route. Solving the weather problem was 
especially important for passenger aviation because passengers could not parachute 
out of their planes, as airmail pilots sometimes did. By linking a system of weather 
reporting stations—more than 40 of them, strung along its route—T.A.T. sought to "place 
before the pilot an exact picture of conditions surrounding him." These stations, when 
coupled with the airline's vast radio network, meant that a pilot could be "informed of 
adverse conditions lying ahead of him and advised to detour through more favorable 
areas."  This new ability to see distant weather would, the airline hoped, greatly 121
reduce the danger of flying. These three systems—radio, teletype, and weather—knit 
the entire transcontinental airline into a tightly coordinated, interconnected network and 
shrunk the distance between planes and airports. They made flight predictable, and 
therefore safer. T.A.T.'s planes would range through empty skies and land at lonely 
airports, but they would never be alone.
The airline's planes, like its infrastructure, were chosen with an emphasis on 
safety and reliability. Early airplanes, commonly built from wood and cloth and powered 
by a single engine, were small, crude, and unreliable.  Aviation technology in the late 122
1920s was so unsophisticated that Lindbergh, whose role in the airline included 
 Transcontinental Air Transport, "TAT Weather Services," TAT Plane Talk Apr. 1929: 1-6. SPL AHC.121
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selecting airplanes, was, in his words, "planning an airline around nonexistent aircraft." 
"Airplanes had to be faster, safer, and more reliable than the best being produced," he 
later wrote.  On Lindbergh's recommendation, the airline purchased ten Ford Tri-123
Motors (see Figure 3). The Tri-Motor—a big, metal monoplane with three engines—had 
its genesis with Henry Ford, who had declared that "metal's the thing of the future."  124
Metal was more durable than fabric, especially important for an airplane's wings, where 
lifting ability could be adversely affected by fabric degradation. An airplane with multiple 
engines could sustain flight even if an engine failed, making it safer, far more reliable, 
and vastly better suited to passenger service than a single-engine plane. "There is also 
a traffic sales advantage in operating a passenger line with all metal ships," wrote 
Lindbergh in an equipment selection report, "and as the public becomes better 
acquainted with flying this advantage will increase."  As it had with airport 125
construction, the airline chose equipment carefully, guided by the need to keep its 
passengers safe and comfortable.
As it built runways and radio towers, the airline also built a mental infrastructure, 
a way for the public to understand it. In this realm, the airline worked not from scratch, 
but built on the store of air-mindedness that had accumulated in the American 
consciousness over the previous two decades. If the airline was to attract passengers, it 
first had to allay common concerns about aviation. Many people "do not take to the 
skies naturally without nervousness," wrote Keys.  To normalize the experience and 126
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give potential passengers a point of comparison, T.A.T. repeatedly compared air travel 
to rail travel.  The passenger experience it offered was almost comparable to Pullman 127
class accommodations on trains. Its planes had on-time records "that may well be 
compared with the records of our greatest railroads."  And its pilots were "building a 128
tradition of the air that will stand beside the older traditions of land and sea—traditions 
great because all alike are founded on safety, regularity, reliability."  Linking T.A.T. to 129
the railroads and to earlier forms of transportation would, the airline hoped, locate it 
within a historical continuum that passengers could understand.
The airline also traded heavily on its relationship with aviation celebrities. Charles 
Lindbergh personified aviation and the airline's marketing materials invoked his name as 
often as possible, noting his selection of airport sites, his survey of airplanes, and his 
management of pilot hiring.  The airline also hired Amelia Earhart, who had risen to 130
fame in 1928 for being the first woman to fly across the Atlantic Ocean (albeit as a 
member of the flight crew, not as a pilot).  That same year, Earhart became the first 131
woman to fly solo across the United States. Her role with T.A.T. was "Assistant to the 
General Traffic Manager," but, as with Lindbergh, her title was less important than her 
 This tactic resembles earlier techniques of Western boosterism, in whose publications the landscape 127
of the West "was always incomparably good, but it was rarely, if ever, presented as being in any way 
foreign or unusual." See: David M. Wrobel, Promised Lands: Promotion, Memory, and the Creation of the 
American West. (Lawrence, KS: University P of Kansas, 2002.) 41. Similarly, Pan American Airways 
normalized air travel by comparing it to steamship travel.
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association with the airline. Earhart wrote a column directed at female passengers for 
TAT Plane Talk, the airline's monthly newsletter.  Such celebrity endorsements would, 132
the company hoped, communicate to potential passengers that it was a quality 
operation.
The airline also attempted to assuage passenger concerns with aesthetics. The 
cabin of each Ford Tri-Motor was sumptuously appointed. "Interior decorations and 
fittings are in soft restful tones with here and there a touch of modern art," noted a 
company brochure.  Each of the ten wicker seats inside the cabin—five on each side 133
of a narrow aisle—had its own wall light, a window that slid open, and a floor heater. 
The cabin was equipped with a lavatory and small galley. There were magazines and 
daily newspapers available. A courier—T.A.T.'s term for flight attendant—attended to 
passengers, selling playing cards, offering stationary, and setting up "portable tables" on 
request. Meals, prepared by Fred Harvey chefs and delivered to the plane when it 
stopped in St. Louis, tended to be light. On one early flight, passengers were offered 
"freshly made sandwiches—chicken salad, egg salad, and cheese—along with a pickle, 
a piece of cake, an apple, a banana, and a choice of coffee or milk," served by the 
courier on portable tables with lavender tablecloths.  In short, read a company 134
brochure, the Tri-Motor offered "all the comforts and facilities of ordinary transportation," 
as if it were an airborne Pullman coach.  135
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The couriers and pilots wore uniforms modeled on U.S. Navy uniforms: Navy 
blue double-breasted jackets with gold sleeve stripes denoting rank, white shirt and dark 
tie, navy blue trousers, and a navy blue combination cap.  This outfit was designed to 136
impart a sense of order to passengers, suggesting that aviation was orderly and 
hierarchical, and visibly countering the popular assumption that pilots were daring 
rascals in leather bomber jackets. 
T.A.T. marketed its service to business travelers, tourists, and "frequent 
travelers." The speed advantage enjoyed by the airplane over the train meant that "the 
business man who estimates his wealth in hours as well as dollars will find it profitable" 
to travel by air, wrote an airline brochure. A business traveler could even use an 
airplane's on-board radio to "stay in touch with his office in New York." For the tourist, 
the airplane's speed was "a means of lengthening his play time." T.A.T. offered stop-
over privileges in the Southwest so that travelers could enjoy a Fred Harvey Detour, a 
package tour for "detourists" who wanted to travel off the beaten-path. The frequent 
traveler, who perhaps found rail travel boring, "will welcome the new service as an 
opportunity of becoming acquainted with and understanding America."  By showing 137
how these groups could benefit from air travel, T.A.T. hoped to accustom potential 
passengers to the idea of flight.
Construction and marketing continued as May slipped into June, and June into 
July. Keys had announced in January that T.A.T. would not begin passenger service 
until "the day we are properly ready," thereby turning an unknown opening date into an 
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asset.  More than a year of development—why rush things? The past year's work had 138
been guided by Keys's watchwords: safety, reliability, affordability. As T.A.T. turned its 
collective efforts from building an airline to operating one, 'quality' entered this 
parthenon of watchwords. It had been no simple feat to build an airline, but neither 
would it be simple to keep passengers happy—or even to keep passengers. 
 "Terminal Facilities and Their Development," TAT Plane Talk. An earlier version of this saying appeared 138
in the first issue of TAT Plane Talk.
Fraga  52
4. Ascent and Descent, or: "Fly The Lindbergh Line."
Even with fifteen years of flying experience this inaugural trip over T.A.T. is astoundingly 
pleasant as we now are flying above continental divide at nine thousand feet. I have just 
looked down upon lava beds and into extinct volcano craters and observed scenery as 
mankind never before has seen it. I predict a great future for T.A.T. All passengers aboard 
are highly enthusiastic over trip scenic effects and T.A.T. efficiency. Never again do I wish 
to use a railroad to cross the continent
—Edgar S. Gorrell, passenger aboard the inaugural flight, in a telegram composed en 
route 139
Transcontinental Air Transport began passenger service on July 7, 1929. 
Lindbergh's brief tap of his transcontinental button was a link in a chain of made-for-
media moments that composed the tightly choreographed, forty-eight-hour long 
inauguration of service. The ceremonies emphasized themes of celebrity, incorporation, 
and nationalism. For these two days, the culmination of the company's public relations 
effort, it seemed as thought T.A.T. had done the impossible: It had slashed travel times 
between the coasts in half, while charging a fare comparable to that of the railroad.  140
But the true test of T.A.T.'s accomplishments would occur over the weeks and months 
that followed. Would people want to fly?
The airline's opening day began with ceremonies at Pennsylvania Station in New 
York City. A thousand people gathered to hear a roster of speeches and to watch the 
departure of The Airway Limited, the Pennsylvania Railroad's new overnight train to 
Columbus, Ohio, T.A.T.'s jumping-off point. The five people who spoke—Paul 
Henderson, vice-president of T.A.T.; Amelia Earhart, who held an executive post with 
T.A.T.; Elisha Lee, vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad; Dr. John H. Finley, 
editor of The New York Times; and Hon. Grover Whalen, the police commissioner of 
 " 'The Day We Are Properly Ready,' " TAT Plane Talk, SPL AHC.139
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New York City—represented the transportation companies involved, the media, and the 
government, with a dash of grandeur and celebrity thrown in.  The speeches were 141
broadcast live over radio stations in New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati, extending 
the event beyond those present.  Dr. Finley, his paper reported,142
recalled the days of the covered wagon, telling of his view of the first train "as it came 
creeping slowly across the prairies on a newly laid track." "A few months ago, in visiting 
my birthplace," he said, "I saw a beacon in sight of the field which I had plowed as a boy 
and near it an emergency landing field where—it is now proudly related—one who was 
known to the people of the neighborhood as 'Lindy' used to alight as an airmail pilot."143
Finley's speech echoed the themes of manifest destiny that had ricocheted about the 
West for decades. His careful chronology of the successive forms of transportation that 
were used to bridge the West turned away from the novelty of air-mindedness and 
instead emphasized how aviation was similar to that which came before it, not different. 
In Finley's formulation, airplanes naturally followed covered wagons and trains—they 
were already familiar, just as T.A.T.'s marketing materials had repeatedly suggested.
The ceremonies included the christening of one of T.A.T.'s Ford Tri-Motors. The 
airplane, named The City of New York, had been brought into Pennsylvania Station for 
the occasion.  Each of T.A.T.'s planes was named for a city along its route. This 144
practice, when applied to airplanes, was a powerful metaphor of incorporation. Each 
plane physically linked cities to each other and into a larger national transportation 
network; their names emphasized their ability to shrink distance. Amelia Earhart 
christened the ship, tying her celebrity to the airplane's purpose.
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After the speeches, after the last passengers had boarded The Airway Limited, 
the crowd at Platform 15 grew quiet in anticipation (see Figure 6). At 6:05 PM, Eastern 
time, the light flashed, the crowd cheered, and the train rolled slowly out of the 
station,  as a band on a flatcar rolled alongside, playing "California, Here We 145
Come."  It was as if Lindbergh had reached one hand across the continent to summon 146
the train. The ritual emphasized that the airline should be thought of in national, not 
local, terms. Air travel connected the country, and so it made sense that its inaugural 
proceedings would also. The ceremonies held over the next two days continued to 
stress this new sense of incorporation.
The next morning, The Airway Limited arrived at Columbus, Ohio, to a station 
decked with American-flag bunting. A crowd of 3,000 people had gathered in the steady 
morning rain to watch its arrival and await the take-off of two planes, The City of 
Columbus and The City of Wichita. Just before 8:15 AM, Eastern time, the two planes, 
"looking very much like two huge bugs," taxied to the center of the field and sat, 
propellors spinning, awaiting clearance for take-off. The signal came from Robert P. 
Lamont, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, who pushed a button in Washington, DC, 
"which sounded a gong at planeside" in Columbus.  This cross-country ritual 147
replicated Lindbergh's transcontinental reach. The City of Columbus would take off from 
the city's airport, but Lamont's interjection reminded the assembled observers that there 
was little about the day that was local. Along the route, "brief ceremonies were held at 
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each T.A.T. station as the inaugural planes paused for fuel," and the route across 
America was slowly consecrated, airport by airport.148
That same day, in Los Angeles, 30,000 people assembled to watch the departure 
of the first east-bound plane, The City of Los Angeles. Actress Mary Pickford, America's 
sweetheart, christened the airplane just before take-off and Charles Lindbergh flew the 
first east-bound leg, from Los Angeles to Winslow, Arizona (see Figure 6). He stayed at 
Winslow overnight and then flew the final leg of the west-bound plane carrying the 
passengers that had left New York at the push of his button two days earlier. This plane, 
The City of Philadelphia, was received by 20,000 people in Los Angeles and christened 
by Gloria Swanson, another movie star.  The inclusion of celebrities in these 149
ceremonies served to generate public interest in the airline and its passenger service.
Each of these events connected the local to the national, just as Lindbergh's 
stops along his air tour had done the previous year. The ceremonies surrounding the 
airline's opening days were developed and staged to have maximum impact in the 
national media. T.A.T. was an airline, but also an idea, an idea endorsed by celebrities 
and trusted firms and made national through newspapers, radio broadcasts, and 
newsreels.  On that clear July day, Lindbergh pushed a button and catapulted the idea 150
of transcontinental passenger air service into the national consciousness. The 48-hour-
celebration of the start of service was, in many ways, the high point of the airline's short 
life. 
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The gleam and glitz quickly faded. Although more than 55,000 people attended 
some part of the opening day ceremonies, and while thousands more watched, listened, 
or read about them, the airline attracted few passengers. In July, its first month of 
operation, the airline reported filling 37% of its available capacity. In August, it filled 
47.5% of capacity. To the airline, these "steadily increasing figures" were an "indication 
of the general demand for air and rail travel."  But these numbers also meant that 151
T.A.T. was routinely flying its planes half-empty: On its ten-passenger Tri-Motors, a 
plane that was 37% full meant three or four passengers—flown and attended to by a 
crew of three. Keys privately expressed disappointment that the passenger load factor 
wasn't higher.  Americans, it seems, were still thrilled by the idea of flight, but not 152
terribly interested in becoming passengers.
If passengers had to acclimate to the idea of flying, it seems also that pilots had 
to acclimate to the idea of flying passengers. Shortly before the start of service, Paul F. 
Collins, the airline's superintendent, wrote a memorandum that outlined rules for T.A.T.'s 
pilots. "Bearing in mind that many of our passengers have never been in the air before 
and that their safety and comfort are our primary considerations," he wrote, "steep 
climbing turns, side slips, and a rolling ship are to be avoided as much as possible."  153
T.A.T.'s executives were obviously concerned with making air travel feel smooth, but the 
company's pilots, while they looked clean-cut in their naval uniforms, still had some 
daredevil in them. Two months later, Collins penned a second memo, writing that "It is 
found necessary to again emphasize the elimination of climbing turns and steep banks, 
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except in an emergency."  Passengers, substantially less accustomed to the feeling of 154
flight, felt jolts and banks more acutely than did pilots.
Not that the Tri-Motors made flight comfortable for passengers. The Tri-Motor's 
small cabin was not insulated against the noise or vibration of the plane's three huge 
engines. The cabin was extremely loud and vibrated as if passengers were in a car 
barreling down a gravel road.  The lack of insulation further meant that passengers 155
alternately sweated and shivered their way through the Southwest. On the ground, the 
all-aluminum airplane caught and held the sun's rays, turning the cabin into an oven. As 
the plane climbed to its cruising altitude, the cabin temperature dropped towards 
freezing, a condition that the inadequate on-board heaters could do little to correct. And 
because the cabins were not pressurized, T.A.T.'s planes had to fly comparatively low, 
at altitudes between 3,000 and 5,000 feet. (Above 8,000 feet, people begin to be 
affected by altitude sickness; above 10,000 feet, they lose consciousness.) Flying this 
low meant that the planes were buffeted by turbulence, especially over rocky terrain. A 
service ceiling of 5,000 feet also meant that T.A.T.'s planes had to fly around storms, 
instead of over them. The noise, the vibration, the vast swings in temperature, and the 
turbulence all combined to make a flight aboard a Tri-Motor an uncomfortable and 
harrowing experience.156
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And then: Disaster. On September 7th, 1929, two months to the day after the 
airline inaugurated service, searchers announced that they had located The City of San 
Francisco, which had been missing for nearly a week. The airplane, it appeared, had 
encountered a storm along its route and reversed course. The pilot, unable to determine 
the plane's exact position, crashed into the side of Mount Taylor, killing all five 
passengers and all three crew. The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The 
Washington Post all carried news of the disaster on their front pages, and the crash—
the very type of crash the airline had hoped its weather and radio networks would 
prevent—stood to dramatically impact the airline's public image. The airline immediately 
suspended service so that its airplanes could be "thoroughly tested and examined for 
their air worthiness,"  and issued a statement in the next issue of TAT Plane Talk: 157
"Every member of the T A T organization shares the sorrow of relatives and friends of 
those who were aboard the plane." 
While the airline could inspect its planes and issue regrets, the cause had been 
pilot error and there was little else it could do. The same note in TAT Plane Talk 
reminded passengers that "Never was an air line presented for public service with such 
thorough preparation and adequate equipment."  When service resumed the following 158
week, the first plane to fly out of Columbus had ten passengers—100% capacity for a 
Tri-Motor.  It is difficult to know what to make of this. Perhaps the tide of public opinion 159
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was turning and Americans, initially skittish about flight, had come to see aviation as just 
another mode of transportation. 
Whatever the case, T.A.T. lost money on its operations in 1929. Keys and his 
fellow directors expected to lose money at first. Soon before the start of service, Keys 
had written that "losses have occurred in the early days of almost all known forms of 
passenger transportation by steamship, rail, bus, or electric lines. There is nothing 
unusual, therefore, in expecting the same to happen in air transportation."  T.A.T. had 160
banked the money necessary to carry it through such short-term losses until operating 
costs dropped far enough for the venture to be profitable. Keys had supreme 
"confidence that in the long run this business will become a very great and very 
profitable business."  But the directors' store of capital didn't prepare them for the 161
stock market crash in October of 1929.
Keys initially dismissed the crash. "The aeronautical industry as a whole will no 
doubt be affected by the financial developments of the past month in about the same 
way and to about the same degree that other similar industries will be affected," he 
wrote in October.  If anything, the crash would prune smaller, poorly-capitalized 162
companies and "automatically reduce the competition against the older, well-financed 
companies," including his own. But the seriousness of the crash soon became evident. 
By January, the value of aviation stocks had plummeted. As passenger bookings 
dropped, T.A.T. responding by slashing fares for a transcontinental trip, to $127.50 
($1,600) from $319 ($4,000). The company cheerily announced the cuts with a 
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justification that obscured the new financial reality: "Recognizing the ever increasing 
popularity of air travel, with the rapidly rising demand for the type of luxurious 
transportation offered by Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., a substantial reduction in 
rates has been made."  Privately, the company was less buoyant. In the annual report 163
for the 1929 fiscal year, Keys wrote: "While operating losses had, of course, been 
expected during the pioneer steps of this enterprise, these results were disappointing, 
both in respect to gross volume of traffic and to cost of operations."  Indeed, the fare 164
cuts only made a bad situation worse. Before the crash, Keys had written that "It is 
hardly possible to sell, at a profit, transportation by air for passengers"—and that was 
when the airline planned on fares of $300 or more.  The airline was left with a revenue 165
of about six cents per passenger mile, far below its per-mile operating costs. By the end 
of 1929, T.A.T. was losing money on every flight. After the receipts were totaled, the 
airline had spent three times as much money as it made, nearly $500,000 in revenue 
($6 million) but more than $1.5 million in expenses ($18 million). In fiscal year 1929, the 
airline posted an operating deficit of nearly a million dollars ($12 million) and was on 
track to lose several hundred thousand dollars in 1930.  Its financial position was not 166
sustainable. For the last three years, Keys had carefully shaped and shepherded the 
airline from its first conception to its final realization. Now, "the first great passenger 
trunk line of the country"  seemed headed for bankruptcy. 167
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Coda, or: "How Far is An Hour?"
These are fundamental things. On them the future must be built. You may take it for 
granted that that future is a permanent future, that air transport is a settled and 
permanent thing and that nearly all of you will live to see every city in the United States 
linked to every other city by this fastest known means of safe transportation.
– Clement Keys, January 1929 168
In 1930, as Transcontinental Air Transport wobbled through another rough year, 
U.S. Postmaster General Walter Folger Brown looked out over a nation buzzing with 
small airplanes operated by small airlines. Brown shared Keys' desire for national 
passenger service: He wanted "an integrated national network of transcontinental lines 
operated by large, well-financed corporations in regulated competition with one 
another."But instead, the country had "a plethora of little airlines covering the nation," 
and Brown "could not build a national air transportation network around little 
companies."  Brown had the power to dramatically restructure the nation's air 169
transportation system. Most of the country's airlines were under contract with the Post 
Office to carry airmail, and the McNary-Watres Act, which had just passed into law on 
April 29, 1930, expanded Brown's authority over how routes and contracts were 
assigned to airlines—power that he used to promote passenger aviation.
Brown changed airmail contracts to add a per-mile bonus for airplanes that 
carried passengers, subsidizing and thereby encouraging passenger transport. Then, 
over a series of conferences with aviation industry leaders, Brown consolidated the 
industry by encouraging—and sometimes mandating—mergers between companies. 
His vision, van der Linden writes, "involved an integrated national network of 
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transcontinental lines operated by large, well-financed corporations in regulated 
competition with each other," and his goal was "to save the major passenger airlines."  170
Brown aimed to have three transcontinental lines, following northern, middle, and 
southern routes. For the middle route, Brown picked out T.A.T. and Western Air Express. 
T.A.T., experience-rich, cash-poor, and still losing money, readily acceded to Brown's 
proposition that it merge with Western, a thriving, successful regional airmail line with a 
network that covered the West and Southwest. Keys had courted Western before, 
offering an airmail partnership with National Air Transport in 1925 and a merger with 
T.A.T. in 1928. Western had no interest then, and less interest in 1930: Why should it 
take on a struggling company? But Brown insisted, and hinted that their combined 
company would be awarded the airmail contract for the middle route. After six weeks of 
negotiations, Western's directors acquiesced and the companies merged, forming a 
new operation: Transcontinental and Western Air. It, too, would be The Lindbergh Line.
Transcontinental Air Transport stopped flying on July 15, 1930, one year and 
eight days after it began passenger service. One of its promotional pamphlets—studded 
with images of the large Tri-Motors in flight, their smartly uniformed pilots and couriers, 
the radio and weather men hard at work—had told passengers that "TAT service, while 
transcontinental in its scope, is an extension of existing transportation facilities 
throughout the United States," the pamphlet read. "It is, in a word, the highest 
achievement of American Transportation."  And for a while, it was. It had been as if 171
Keys, a modern-day Prometheus, had stolen the technology of flight from aviation 
demigods and presented it to mere mortals. He had made the skies safe and 
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comfortable, a place where well-to-do travelers could play cards, dictate telegrams, or 
take afternoon tea. He had tamed the clouds and domesticated the idea of flight.
On December 29, 1934, long after Lindbergh's flight and Lindbergh's button and 
the merger with Western Air Express, T.A.T. stockholders found a letter from the 
company's secretary, asking them to swap their shares of stock for shares of T.&W.A.  172
The stock-swap formally ended T.A.T.'s long flight. 
The legacy of this short-lived airline is two-fold. First, the possibility of crossing 
the continent in 48 hours shrunk the nation. Second, the airline's transcontinental 
mission brought the West closer to the East. T.A.T is responsible for the underpinnings 
of these two ideas, a smaller nation and a closer West.
The airplane resembled the railroad in its ability to collapse distance. Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch, in his analysis of the changes wrought by the railroad, wrote that the 
railroad's speed meant that a "given spatial distance, traditionally covered in a fixed 
amount of travel time, could suddenly be dealt with in a fraction of that time; to put it 
another way, the same amount of time permitted one to cover the old spatial distance 
many times over."  Just as "space was both diminished and expanded" by the speed 173
of the railroad,  so to was it diminished and expanded by the speed of the airplane, 174
drawing physically distant cities and towns closer together in time. Speed, intimately 
bound to time, brought distant places closer. This rhetoric was used again and again in 
the airline's promotional materials and by the reporters who wrote articles about its 
service. A transcontinental airline, opined the San Francisco Chronicle, "must have a 
 Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., letter to stockholders, 12/29/1934. MSSA Lindbergh, MS 325, 172
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speeding up influence on transaction of business and stimulation of travel. It puts within 
reach of many people what they have been denied by limitations of time."  Relative 175
distance between cities melted into ever-smaller units of time. In its marketing materials, 
T.A.T. compared the relative travel times between cities: "Kansas City, normally 34 
hours from New York [by train] is brought within 19 hours." An air trip between Los 
Angeles, California, and Clovis, New Mexico, was "six hours against almost a 24-hour 
journey by train." And a flight between Indianapolis, Indianapolis, and St. Louis, 
Missouri, was only two hours, "a saving of four hours in the heart of the business 
day."  Speed was at once distance, time, and commodity. "At any of the ticket 176
windows nearby, you can purchase a small strip of pasteboard that represents two 
useful days added to your life—two days snatched from traveling time,"  wrote the 177
Pennsylvania Railroad in an advertisement for T.A.T.
The airplane's boundlessness allowed it to be seen as an instrument of 
internationalization. As Jenifer van Vleck has argued: "Soaring above the territorial 
borders of nation-states, airplanes appeared to diminish the very significance of 
geopolitics."  Aboard an airplane, borders could be not just crossed but transcended. 178
Aviation "allowed Americans to conceive the entire globe as an object of analysis and 
sphere of influence."  The airplane was a tool for looking outward, for thinking the 179
world and imagining America's place within it. But it was also used to look inward and to 
reinforce existing borders. Benedict Anderson has argued that the rise of print 
 "What It Means When Railroads Join Hands With Air Transport," The San Francisco Chronicle.175
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capitalism in the eighteenth century "made it possible to 'think' the nation," to 
understand a group of invisible fellow-readers as homogenous and interconnected.  180
Similarly, T.A.T.'s explicit project to be a transcontinental trunk line, a national backbone, 
offered a new way to think the nation: As a national entity solidly contained between two 
coasts, instead of a boundless confederation of local or regional groups. Keys's decision 
to fly transcontinentally—rather than locally, or up or down a coast, or across an ocean
—was a deliberate one. The choice was guided, partially, by concerns about cost, 
safety, and reliability, but also by a desire to bridge the continent. 
A transcontinental trip implies completion or enclosure: There is nowhere further 
to go. Such journeys have long captured the American imagination and the journey to 
the Pacific is a well-known trope of national incorporation. Meriwether Lewis and William 
Clark surveyed newly-acquired western lands with their Corps of Discovery between 
1804 and 1806. In the middle of the nineteenth century, thousands of pioneers traveled 
the Overland Trail between Missouri and Oregon. Transcontinental stagecoach service 
began in 1858, offering a three-week journey to the Pacific coast. And the completion of 
the transcontinental railroad line in 1869 seemed especially heartening, coming as it did 
at the end of the Civil War. Now air travel would have its turn to bridge the trans-
MIssissippi West. "The distance between the Atlantic and the Pacific is being gradually 
eliminated by air and rail," read the letter of introduction that Amelia Earhart carried to 
the governor of California on T.A.T.'s inaugural flight.  The interconnection that 181
passenger aviation promised was regarded in national terms. "The possibility of drawing 
the two coast lines of America closer together by two days, has perhaps made the 
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 44-45.180
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deepest impression" on passengers, noted one of T.A.T.'s circulars.  C. C. Young, the 182
governor of California, wrote in a telegram praising T.A.T.'s start of service of his "feeling 
of pleasure that the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards are to be so closely linked by the 
new air transportation service which is being inaugurated today. Anyone who 
contributes toward this bringing nearer together the various states of the Union is doing 
a splendid service to our country as a whole."  Faster transportation meant a smaller 183
country.
T.A.T.'s advertisements further suggested that to see the country from above was 
to know it in a new way. Altitude offered a totalizing framework that could accommodate 
all the unique parts of the United States. T.A.T.'s planes flew at relatively low altitudes by 
contemporary standards: Between 1,000 and 5,000 feet, compared to 30,000 feet 
today. Just as Lindbergh's recounting of his 1928 national air tour focussed on how he 
came to know the country through its geography—"New England's valleys dotted by 
white villages, the crystal waters of Michigan's great lakes, Arizona's pastel 
deserts" —T.A.T.'s promotional materials emphasized that the airplane's elevation 184
above the earth was a new way for passengers to understand the country below. "The 
snow capped mountain ridges take on a beauty not apparent from the earth. Historic 
spots such as old Fort Wingate, a veteran of Indian fighting, now an Indian school and 
hospital, lie directly on the route," read one pamphlet.  The plane, at a remove from 185
the terrain below it, offered new perspectives on the nation's geography and history, and 
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passenger service translated air-mindedness into an air-nationalism. "You have crossed 
the continent in 48 hours and the journey has left deep impressions of the vast beauty 
of America," read a T.A.T. pamphlet.  These two aspects of flight, speed and altitude, 186
each made the country feel smaller.
 While T.A.T. was national in scope, it found special resonance in the West. 
Aviation was growing quickly in the West, The New York Times reported in 1929, citing a 
report published by the Department of Commerce: "Three air lines on the Pacific Coast 
carried the largest number of passengers of all aviation services in the country during 
1928."  One of the more surprising features of the report, the Times noted, was the 187
extent to which people in the West were using aviation for local travel: flying up and 
down the West Coast. This enthusiasm for aviation was also visible in different regional 
responses to T.A.T.'s announcement in May of 1928 that it was planning a 
transcontinental airline. On the East Coast, The New York Times ran a brief story under 
the headline "Air Rail Line To Link All Principal Cities,"  a story that largely replicated 188
T.A.T.'s press release.  But on the West Coast, the announcement of service was 189
greeted both with excitement and dismay. The San Francisco Chronicle announced the 
service with a banner headline—"Air, Rail Combine To Link Coasts"—across its front 
page. In their headlines, these papers betrayed their regional ties: To the West, the 
airline existed to link the coasts, not to connect different cities. The San Francisco 
 Transcontinental Air Transport, Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. [Brochure], MSSA Lindbergh.186
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Examiner, the Chronicle's rival paper, was so miffed that Los Angeles had been chosen 
as the airline's western terminus that it mounted a publicity campaign for T.A.T. service, 
more than a year before such service became available. The Examiner's response 
suggests that some in the West saw access to aviation much as they had seen 
railroads: As masters of their economic future. Perhaps the West, having experienced 
the economic boom that accompanied the railroad, had cause to view the airplane with 
excitement. The East, more established, perhaps found aviation less essential. But the 
interconnection aviation afforded remained exciting.
That excitement outlived the airline. Airline advertisements from the late 1930s 
and early 1940s emphasized linking the West and themes of national interconnection. 
An advertisement for United Air Lines offered the headline "New York to California in the 
Age of Flight," under a montage of transportation (see Figure 7). On the ground, right to 
left, a covered wagon, stagecoach, Pony Express rider, and locomotive all sped towards 
the viewer, recapitulating the transportation methods that bridged the West. Above, 
transcendent, was the silhouette of an airplane. "Over this Overland Route trudged the 
covered wagon, traveling only as far in a whole day as you will go [by plane] in three 
minutes."  The West had been conquered with the aid of many different types of 190
transportation technology, but only with aviation, the advertisement suggested, had the 
vast West been tamed, shrunk to manageable proportions. An advertisement for the 
aviation industry summarized the new index of speed and distance, asking "How Far Is 
An Hour?" under an image of a western road leading into a sunset (see Figure 8). A 
horse and buggy crawled towards the sunset; above them, dark against the sky, a silver 
 United Air Lines "New York to California in the Age of Flight," 1944. Ad*Access, 1 Mar. 2010.190
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airplane sped west. "To the thousands of people who travel by air, miles are merely 
minutes...oceans and continents, hours," the ad read.  The speed of the airplane 191
collapsed time and distance into each other, shrinking the continent. With air travel, 
America was smaller in 1930 than it had been in 1920; by 1940, it would be smaller still. 
T.A.T. set off a ceaseless drive for faster transcontinental flights that culminated with 
five-hour transcontinental jet travel in 1959.
Aviation also brought the West within closer reach of Eastern tourists. Western 
tourism had originated with the Santa Fe Railway and with Fred Harvey, whose package 
tours and souvenirs created an idea of the West as an ancient, authentic land of 
stunning natural beauty. T.A.T. was the first airline to use tourism as a way of marketing 
passenger service, an idea that outlasted its corporate death. In pamphlets from the 
1930s, American Airlines promoted the West as "the land of Yesterday."  Its pamphlets, 
directed at "New Yorkers, Detroiters, Chicagoans," and other Easterners,  called the 192
West "the country of the Last Frontier—here is romance, color and thrilling 
adventure."  The West was marketed as exotic, yet familiar, a place of cowboys and 193
cactus within America's own borders. The West offered something for everyone: If 
tourists did not care to play cowboy on a dude ranch, one could "come, forget your 
cares, rest and play in this golden sunshine and breathe this dry, bracing air—that's 
living!"  The West was revitalizing, restorative, the antidote to a dull life. Conveniently, 194
speedy airplanes put the distant West within reach. "For a Grand Vacation, FLY," read 
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one pamphlet, explaining that an air traveler could "Eliminate hurry from your itinerary... 
yet see more and go farther, in less time." Flying offered "the economy of the most 
vacation for your money. For example: If you have a two-weeks holiday, you can spend 
14 days vacationing, without hustle and fuss... when you let our planes do your 
hurrying."  The ideas that T.A.T. had used to sell its service—speed, time, leisure, the 195
ability to shrink distance—appeared again and again in aviation advertisements during 
the following years.
The question is this: Did Clement Keys and Transcontinental Air Transport 
succeed or fail? Over two years, Keys raised five million dollars in capital, persuaded 
Charles Lindbergh and the Pennsylvania Railroad and dozens of other people and 
companies to join the venture, and directed the construction of a national air route and 
its accompanying weather system. He built it. Passengers didn't come. After a year of 
flying at a loss, the airline was desperate and readily accepted the Post Office's request 
that it merge with Western Air Express. Financially, the airline failed. 
But Transcontinental Air Transport remains important not so much for what it 
accomplished during its short life, but for what it left behind. The airline literally paved 
the way for future aviation,  leaving a physical infrastructure that included more than a 196
dozen airports, nearly fifty weather stations, and hundreds of radio towers. It built an 
ideological infrastructure and showed how aviation could have a meaningful impact on 
the lives of Americans, whether they were business travelers or tourists. It set the 
standard and paradigm for passenger service, with in-flight meals, adjustable seats, and 
passenger stewards. And it pushed aviation technology forward, demanding airplanes 
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that were larger, faster, and safer. A truly national airline, a paradigm of service, an 
enduring call for better airplanes: These were new ideas at the time, and their staying 
power has proved immense. Transcontinental Air Transport flung America into a new air 
age, an age that was, in a way, the fulfillment of Lindbergh's implicit promise: Build an 
airport and the future will arrive. Between there and here, then and now, 
Transcontinental Air Transport remains an essential link between an America that rode 
the rails and an America that wings the skies. 
Fraga  72
Figure 1 - Clement Keys and Charles Lindbergh
             
Clement Keys, founder and president of Transcontinental Air Transport, at left. Charles 
Lindbergh, chairman of the airline's Technical Committee, at right.  197
 "Transcontiental Air Transport, Inc." TAT Plane Talk, SPL AHC.197
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Figure 2 - "Lindbergh Does It!"
 
The New York Times announced Lindbergh's successful transatlantic flight.  198
 "Lindbergh Does It! To Paris In 33 1/2 Hours," The New York Times, 22 May 1927198
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Figure 3 - The City of Columbus
 
The City of Columbus, one of the airline's Ford Tri-Motors, as pictured in the first issue 
of TAT Plane Talk. Note the unmuffled engines at the nose and under the wing, which 
made the uninsulated cabin very loud.  199
 "Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc." TAT Plane Talk, SPL AHC.199
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Figure 4 - The T.A.T. Route
 
The airline's transcontinental route was partly constrained by geography, the routes of 
its partner railroads, and the population centers of the country. The route wanders off a 
direct route to include Kansas City, Missouri, and to include the overnight Santa Fe 
Railway link between Waynoka, Oklahoma, and Clovis, New Mexico.  200
 Transcontinental Air Transport, Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. [Brochure], MSSA Lindbergh.200
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Figure 5 - T.A.T. Passenger Station in Albuquerque, New Mexico
 
T.A.T's Albuquerque passenger station, pictured in TAT Plane Talk.  201
 "Construction Progress" TAT Plane Talk, SPL AHC.201
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Figure 6 - The Inauguration of Service
 
 
At top, the christening of The Airway Limited just before its departure from Pennsylvania 
Station. At bottom, Charles Lindbergh at the controls of The City of Los Angeles just 
before its departure from Los Angeles.  202
 " 'The Day We Are Properly Ready,' " TAT Plane Talk, SPL AHC.202
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Figure 7 - "New York to California in the Age of Flight."
A United Air Lines advertisement from 1944 compares the speed of air travel to the 
speed of early types of transportation.  203
 United Air Lines "New York to California in the Age of Flight," 1944.203
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Figure 8 - "How Far Is An Hour?"
An industry advertisement from 1943 compares the speed of air travel to the speed of 
early types of transportation.  204
 "How far is an hour?" The Airlines of the United States, 1943.204
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Appendix 1 — Companies owned or controlled by C. M. Keys
List prepared in 1930.205
Aviation Corporation of California
Aviation Credit Corporation
Aviation Securities Corporation, Chicago





Curtiss Aeroplane Export Corporation
Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Company, Inc.
Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc.
Curtiss-Wright Airports Corporation
Curtiss-Safroni Corporation
Curtiss-Robertson Airplane Manufacturing Co.
Curtiss Assets Corporation
Curtiss-Reid Aircraft Co., Ltd., Montreal
Intercontinent Aviation, Inc.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.
Keystone Aircraft Corporation
National Air Transport, Inc.
National Aviation Corporation
North American Aviation, Inc.
Pitcairn Aviation, Inc.
Sperry Gyroscope Company, Inc.
Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. 
 "Aeronautical companies with which MR C M KEYS is affiliated, either as an Officer or Director," 205
NASM Keys.
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Appendix 2 — The Board of Directors of Transcontinental Air Transport206
Harold Bixby 
Vice-president, The State National Bank, St. Louis, Missouri.
Henry Breckinridge 
Breckinridge & Shonk, Attorneys, St. Louis, Missouri.
Howard E. Coffin
Chairman, National Air Transport, Inc.†; Director, National Aviation Corporation†; 
Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†
J. Cheever Cowdin*
Vice-president, Blair & Company; Vice-president, North American Aviation, Inc.†; 
Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†; Director, National Aviation Corporation†; 
Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†
Chester W. Cuthell*
Cuthell, Hotchkiss & Mills, Attys.; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†; 
Director, National Aviation Corporation†; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; 
Director, Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Co., Inc.†
Thomas Dysart
Knight, Dysart & Gamble, St. Louis, Missouri; Director, North American Aviation, 
Inc.†
Thomas B. Eastland
Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc., San Francisco, California; Director, Aviation 
Corporation of California†; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†
Julien L. Eysmans
Vice-president in charge of Traffic, Pennsylvania Railroad.
Fred ("Freddy") Harvey*
Fred Harvey, Kansas City, Missouri.
Paul Henderson*
Vice-president, National Air Transport, Inc.†; Director, National Air Transport, 
Inc.†; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†
Richard Hoyt*
Hayden, Stone & Company; Chairman of the Board, Wright Aeronautical 
Corporation.†
Leonard Kennedy*
Vice-president, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co., Inc.†; Director, National Air 
Transport, Inc.†; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†; Director, National 
Aviation Corporation†; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†
C. M. Keys*
C. M. Keys & Co.†; President, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co., Inc.†; President, 
North American Aviation, Inc.†; Director, National Air Transport, Inc.†; Director, 
National Aviation Corporation†; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director, 
Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co., Inc.†
Harry B. Knight
Knight, Dysart & Gamble, St. Louis, Missouri.
 "Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc." TAT Plane Talk, SPL AHC.206
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Charles L. Lawrence
President, Wright Aeronautical Corporation†; Director, National Air Transport, 
Inc.†; Director, National Aviation Corporation.†
Walter Marvin
Hemphill, Noyes & Co.; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director, National 




President, National Air Transport, Inc.†; President, Peoples Trust & Savings 
Bank, Chicago; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director, North American 
Aviation, Inc.†; Director, National Aviation Corporation.†
Daniel M. Sheaffer*
Chief of Passenger Transportation, Pennsylvania Railroad.
James C. Willson
J. C. Willson & Co., Louisville, Kentucky; President, National Aviation 
Corporation†; Director, Curtiss Aeroplane & Export Corporation†; Director, 
Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director, North American Aviation, Inc.†
William H. Vanderbilt
Capitalist; Director, Curtiss Flying Service, Inc.†; Director, North American 
Aviation, Inc.†
Names marked by asterisks are members of an Executive Committee.





Aviation History Collection, Seattle Public Library, Seattle, Washington. The Seattle 
Public Library is one of the few archives to have an entire set of TAT Plane Talk, 
the company's monthly newsletter that reported, in exquisite detail, every aspect 
of the airline's construction. Abbreviated SPL AHC in footnotes.
Charles Augustus Lindbergh Papers, Manuscripts & Archives, Yale University Library, 
New Haven, Connecticut. The Lindbergh Papers provides documentation of the 
aviator's entire life, including his involvement with Transcontinental Air Transport. 
Abbreviated MSSA Lindbergh in footnotes.
Clement Melville Keys Papers, Smithsonian National Air & Space Museum Archives, 
Washington, DC. The Keys Papers are an invaluable resource for understanding 
the man and the airline he built. They document the formation and construction of 
Transcontinental Air Transport. Abbreviated NASM Keys in footnotes.
The Hatfield Collection, Museum of Flight, Seattle, Washington. The Hatfield Collection 
is an assortment of aviation esoterica loosely organized around the development 
of aviation in California. Abbreviated MOF Hatfield in footnotes.
The Western Americana Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale 
University, New Haven, Connecticut. The archive's holdings of material related to 
travel and transportation in the American West are extensive. Among the few 
items related to aviation are pamphlets and timetables from the 1930s. 
Abbreviated Beinecke Western Americana Collection in footnotes.  
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Annual Reports
Transcontinental Air Transport. Annual Report [FY 1928]. Wilmington, Del.: 1929.
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